Sun Tzu, The Art of War.
An ancient but simple lesson, forgotten by more than one general or politician.
We expected a tent and three Kalashnikovs - that was the intelligence we were given. Instead, we found a hydraulic steel door leading to a well-equipped network of tunnels.
IDF soldier
The commander of the IDF's northern sector, Lieutenant-General Udi Adam, could barely believe that some of his best soldiers had been so swiftly trapped; neither could the chief of staff. [Dan Halutz]
"What's wrong with the Maglans?" Halutz demanded to know. "They are surrounded," Adam replied quietly. "I must send in more forces."
As the reinforcements of the Egoz brigade prepared to enter Maroun a-Ras and rescue their comrades, however, several were mown down in a second ambush. Hours of battle ensued before the Maglan and Egoz platoons were able to drag their dead and wounded back to Israel.
Hezbollah also suffered heavy casualties but its fighters slipped back into their tunnels to await the next round of fighting. It was immediately obvious to everyone in Tel Aviv that this was going to be a tougher fight than Halutz had bargained for.
As the war unfolded his optimism was brought crashing down to earth - and with it the invincible reputation of the Israeli armed forces.
In five weeks, their critics charge, they displayed tactical incompetence and strategic short-sightedness. Their much-vaunted intelligence was found wanting. Because they were supposed to be fighting a bunch of rag-tag jihadists.
Israel had one option once they decided to take on Hezbollah in a fight: total annihilation of Hezbollah's military arm. Anything short of that would be seen as a failure. And it was a failure, of unbelievable proportions.
Hezbollah, a rag-tag jihadist militia had perfected the tactic of drawing in their enemy and fighting on terrain of their choosing. They had penetrated the Israelis' secure communications, including frequency-hopping systems.
Israel, on the other hand had reduced the training for their reserves and downgraded their equipment. When the time came to put them to work, they were unprepared and under-equipped. Some of the equipment and stores the reserves needed to become effective had been opened up and taken by regular force regiments.
It should not have mattered. They were fighting a rag-tag, jihadist militia. At least that's what they had come to believe. They had no intelligence to prove otherwise.
Halutz committed a sin. His hubris and his ego overwhelmed a simple axiom of warfare: Know your enemy and respect his power.
Halutz and his political masters may now be living on borrowed time. Israeli’s military elite, such as its fighter squadrons and commando units, may still be among the best in the world but the mediocrity of much of the army has been exposed for all in the Middle East to see.Halutz would have done well to read his own country's history. He might then have understood that rag-tag militias such as the Hagana, the Irgun and the Lehi once possessed the strength to defeat one of the world's most powerful nations and fight back the attempt by Arab neighbours to crush Israel in the early days of its existence.
He might have done, but he didn't. He forget the simple lessons of Sun Tzu. Many have.
In fact, we have one of our own who has demonstrated that he too can push aside classic knowledge for a good soundbite.
These are detestable murderers and scumbags. I'll tell you that right up front.And they're your enemy.
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