Sunday, January 28, 2007

An unworkable strategy, a corrupt puppet government. How is that NOT like Viet Nam?

Back here I raised the ghost of Operation Cedar Falls, the US attempt during the Viet Nam war to crush the Viet Cong in the Iron Triangle around Saigon. It failed because,
The Viet Cong choose not to fight and instead melt away into the jungle.
In other words, the US has done this before in another war in another time, but not so long ago that it should be forgotten. It should have been a lesson. Unfortunately, there is a pervading cranial blockage in both the Pentagon and the White House that will not permit a comparison between current day situation in Iraq and the not-ancient history of US military performance in Viet Nam.

In raising that failed strategy, I suggested that exactly the same thing would happen in Baghdad. The "why" is really quite simple. Sending in almost two divisions will only work if the people the US is trying to subdue or destroy actually stay there to let it happen.

Which brings us here:
DEATH SQUAD leaders have fled Baghdad to evade capture or killing by American and Iraqi forces before the start of the troop “surge” and security crackdown in the capital.

A former senior Iraqi minister said most of the leaders loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical anti-American cleric, had gone into hiding in Iran.



Among those said to have fled is Abu Deraa, the Shi’ite militia leader whose appetite for sectarian savagery has been compared to that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who was killed last year.

The former minister, who did not want to be named for security reasons, backed Sunni MPs’ claims that Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, had encouraged their flight. He alleged that weapons belonging to Sadr’s Mahdi Army had been hidden inside the Iraqi interior ministry to prevent confiscation.

Maliki said last week: “I know that senior criminals have left Baghdad, others have left the country. This is good — this shows that our message is being taken seriously.”

Sadr has been unexpectedly subdued about the coming purge, prompting allegations of a deal between the radical cleric and the Iraqi prime minister.

The flight from Baghdad could impede American plans to target the leaders of death squads. An extra 17,000 US troops are being sent to Baghdad as part of the surge in forces promised by President George W Bush.

Although Sadr’s militia has been promised no quarter, American and Iraqi forces hope to avoid having to fight their way through Shi’ite strongholds such as Sadr City, home to 2m impoverished people.

With Bush facing heavy criticism at home over the surge, death squad leaders have every incentive to wait out what could be the president’s last-ditch effort to pacify Baghdad. Zalmay Khalilzad, the outgoing US ambassador to Baghdad, said last week he was concerned that militants were “lying low, avoiding conflict now in order to fight another day”.

I remember, many years ago, sitting talking with some American friends in Honolulu who were quite eager to inform me that the reason the US would never win in Viet Nam is that they had not yet accepted the fact that the traditional application of military force and tactics would never defeat the Viet Cong guerrilla army. Further, they said even if the US changed tactics, it was too late. The Viet Cong had long controlled the countryside.
An interesting theme emerged during that conversation. These US military officers felt that the example of what not to do had been more than demonstrated by the British in various parts of the world after the end of the 2nd World War, including the situation in Palestine from 1945 to 1948.

It was a surprize that these junior officers had it figured out. It is now surprizing that the corporate knowledge and "lessons learned" from past conflicts seem to be shut out of today's planning. Although, the mindset of the US Department of Defense recently departed leader probably hampered the ability to make reference to past events.

It's a different time, it's a different era, it's a different place.
Donald Rumsfeld, July 2003.

But, it's the same problem. And, if you tell them you're coming with two divisions, well, there will probably be a change of tactics to greet you.

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