Oh, well it's all better then

#F35 #Cdnpoli - 

The Harperistas are changing the name of the procurement secretariat for ... the new national fighter jet, formerly believed to be the F-35.

Public Works and Government Services Minister Rona Ambrose confirmed the name change Wednesday in Halifax. The body is now called the national fighter procurement secretariat, she said, adding the name change signals a change in policy.

"I think it's self-evident that the change in policy is that the government is, as we've indicated, hitting restart with this process," Ambrose said.

"One of the reasons for establishing the secretariat is to ensure that we have independently validated information about everything that we need to consider, including the aircraft, and so that will be part of the mandate for the secretariat."

"They will come back to us once they've done that comprehensive, independently validated work and make a recommendation to the government."

But before the lying bastards got around to doing that, they lied to Canadian voters. 

Defence Minister Peter MacKay says cabinet ultimately signed off on the figures the Defence Department cited publicly for the cost of the F-35 stealth fighter program.

"It ultimately goes to cabinet," MacKay told the Senate defence committee on Monday.

Auditor General Michael Ferguson released a scathing report on April 3 that was highly critical of the way the F-35 file had been handled, particularly the Defence Department's failure to reveal that the fighter would cost Canada at least $25 billion — $10 billion more than it was reporting to Parliament and the public weeks before the last federal election.

The Conservative government has admitted it was aware of the larger price tag weeks before the last federal election, but MacKay's comments are the first acknowledgment cabinet approved the reporting of a lower figure to Canadians.

So, they have to get caught before they'll do anything honest.

A point. They admit they lied before and I believe they are lying now. 

The AG repeats his points on the F-35

#F35 #Cdnpoli -

Michael Ferguson repeated the points he made in his report to Parliament on the F-35 boondoggle at the public accounts committee and then added this:

So far, the government has talked about a $25-billion cost over the first 20 years of the program, even though the jets are predicted to last 36 years. 

“There were some significant things that were missing from the life-cycle costing in this, for example attrition, for example upgrades, and the fact that these aircraft were going to last for 36 years, not just 20 years,” Mr. Ferguson told MPs. 

“When we raised the issue of life-cycle costing and the fact that it was not complete, I don’t believe that we were nitpicking in any way. We were saying that there were significant elements that were missing,” he said.

What he did make clear, for the record, is that the $25 billion number, the one the Harperistas were not willing to divulge until someone divulged it for them, had made the trip to cabinet. Harper and MacKay were fully aware of it before the last election.

Then there's this little bit of information. 

The September, 2011, briefing note was signed by deputy defence minister Robert Fonberg.

“The purpose of this trip is to demonstrate the government’s commitment to the JSF program, while impressing upon key interlocutors Canadian concerns with cost, production schedules and the need for transparent communication to JSF partner nations,” the note said.

There was enough concern at DND to shove Fantino down to Fort Worth. That must have been illuminating for them since, before that trip, the F-35 fly-away cost had already ballooned. By March of this year the Harper cost per plane (acquisition only) of $75 million was so obsolete to have become a near joke.

It was a typo!

#F35 #Cdnpoli - 

Elmer's little boy is at it again. Peter MacKay has quietly sneaked in an erratum to the Department of National Defence Plans and Priorities report delivered to Parliament a few months ago.(Emphasis mine)

In an “erratum” note, it says the 2011-12 report wrongly described the F-35 purchase as being in “definition” project phase, which generally means an item has already received preliminary approval from Treasury Board, the gatekeeper for federal spending.

That would mean, (and there are a few of us who write here who really know this), that we would have before us, available for perusal, full life cycle costs and full life cycle material management costs. And the trade-off of industrial regional benefits.

But now ... ?

Instead the decision to buy a next-generation fighter is being reclassified as being in “option analysis” phase, which means Ottawa is still determining what it needs in terms of a plane.

Which means working up the LCC and LCMM on not only the F-35, but also any other contender out there, based on a comprehensive Statement of Requirements. As the Auditor-General pointed out, "5th generation fighter", is not an SOR.

This, however, gets even more precious.

In the note, National Defence blames an unknown bureaucrat for the snafu, saying someone made a “typographical error” in the 2011-12 “Report on Plans and Priorities.”

A typographical error? A typographical error?!!

Look at how your fingers would have to be misplaced on your qwerty keyboard, presumably in complete darkness, to make that significant a typo.

Tack on another lie.

F-35 fading into the future

#F35 #CdnForces #Cdnpoli - 

Here's a syndrome that can only make matters worse for all sides on the F-35 imbroglio. As David Pugliese points out:

Previously, the Canadian government determined it would receive the F-35 during peak production – the so-called “sweet spot’’ that Defence Minister Peter MacKay and others have repeatedly talked about. That was to be 2016, according to DND and government officials.  According to Mr. MacKay and others, the “sweet spot” is the year the jets are to achieve their peak production rate, thus coming off the assembly line at their lowest cost. Over the last year DND officials have extended the “sweet spot” to include a wider range, expanding the period to focus on 2016 to 2021.

But in a March 29 report sent to Congress, the Pentagon’s plan for near peak production rates for the Lockheed Martin jet is now set for 2018. In that year, U.S. F-35 program officials say they will be able to purchase 110 jets, according to a recent article by my colleagues at Defense News. By 2021, the production rate will hit 130 jets, which includes versions for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

So from that congressional report it appears that the “sweet spot” has moved from the original 2016 to at least 2021.

But there are concerns that the peak F-35 production year could shift even further. And Defense News is reporting that there are serious concerns within the U.S. Air Force and Navy about whether they will be able to afford the number of aircraft projected to be bought around 2020 and the years following.

Which creates whole garden boxes of problems for the troop-supporting, standing up for Canada, Harperites.


By the time the first operational F-35 goes wheels down at CFB Cold Lake the F-18 airframes will be so fragile that they won't be able to perform a half of their expected roles. So what happens in the period between when it became critical to start replacing the F-18s and the unbelievably late arrival of their replacement?

The short-sightedness of putting all their eggs in the F-35 basket, (and giving other options less than a passing glance), will have created a huge defence gap. If the kids at DND and their political masters actually believe Canada needs to field a fighter air-force with strike and air superiority capabilities, they're doing little more than mouthing the words.

By the time Canada can take possession of enough F-35s, (at a cost which doesn't put a mortgage on our great-grandchildren), to become an interoperable, coherent element of any combined fighter force, any of the technological advantages attached to the plane today will have evaporated in a multitude of technological countermeasures.

As the price goes up, and it just keeps going up, we will be able to afford fewer and fewer of these so-called advanced weapons platforms. We've already seen the initial acquisition estimate drop from 80, (a rounded down, one-for-one replacement of the existing F-18 fleet), to 65, with no plan for contingencies. When we finally take delivery, because the Harperites and RCAF are so wedded to this one airplane and the ability to fly out front in whatever US-led adventure comes along, we may well have sacrificed our own sovereign air-space protection. And that's not just in the interim - it's forever.

Later.

That won't make it go away, Harper

#F35 #Cdnpoli -

With the wave of an imperial hand Harper sprays himself with teflon.

Asked Sunday in Cartagena, Colombia, whether the government lied about its estimates, Harper again focused on the cost to buy the planes.

"The numbers you talk about are different numbers costing different things. The number that I have talked about is the number we have budgeted for the acquisition of the F-35," he said.

"Other numbers cited ... obviously have to do with not just the acquisition of the F-35, but operations of the F-35. There's more than one number, there's more than one cost depending on what you're counting. These things have all been well known for some time. But in terms of our numbers, we've been very clear — we are going to operate within the budget that we have set."

OK. If the numbers have been so "well known for some time" one would have to ask why he forced an election on the country when he refused to provide them?

As far as living within the budget that they have set, well, that raises another question. What budget? If you don't include the life cycle costs of the F35 purchase then you have no idea how to create the RCAF envelope for the Canadian Forces estimate annually. That is, after all, why we have life cycle costs in the first place.

An accountant would take Harper to the woodshed for a statement like that. The only way a business or a government can determine the cost-effectiveness of a piece of equipment is to determine what it will cost over its lifetime. That's why government regulations require a full life cycle cost estimate.

I wonder, does Harper know any accountants?

Shock and Awe - The Link 16 gap

Something that has never been fully explained, (to tactical weenies like me), is why the proposed initial delivery of 16 F-35 Lightning II, 5th generation, all-singing-all-dancing, they-don't-get-better-than-this strike fighter, is why that delivery will not be capable of operating in a normal NATO environment.

Also missing is a feature known as a Link 16, which allows highly advanced aircraft to exchange data, such as text messages, with ships and other, older aircraft in real-time.

Not to mention that it displays a full tactical picture to the pilot. That system will not come to the F-35 until the Block 4 upgrade. Lockheed Martin is keeping very quiet but that upgrade doesn't show up until 3 years after the initial delivery - whenever that is.

Well, Link 16, the NATO standard for Tactical Data Link is one of those things that you wouldn't think would be left out - ever. At least not in a brand new airplane.

Our need-to-be-replaced F-18 Hornets already have Link 16.

Nothing else compares to the F-35.

Cleared for unrestricted take off - F35 acquisition

#F35 #Cdnpoli -

We've followed this thing from the 1997 entry into the F-35 development through to the Harper Conservative sign on to the 2006 JSF Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development project. 

At that point in late 2006 there was something else occupying the minds of many at NDHQ - Afghanistan. As the war in Afghanistan spun up, so did the problems. Canadian troops, usually in the point position in the Panjwai district were sorely in need of a greater level of support. There was a scramble to get Leopard C2 tanks into theatre along with better artillery. There was a line that moved all through the armed services: "If it isn't about Afghanistan, it isn't worth shit."


General Rick Hillier was making loud noises about helicopters. With no heavy lift helicopter capability Canadian troops were vulnerable as they moved over treacherous ground to complete patrols and sweeps, and to provide sufficient protection to provincial reconstruction teams. Another mad scramble took place and an advance contract award notice (ACAN) was issued for 15 Chinook medium/heavy lift helicopters.

That should have set off alarm bells. The Chinook contract was a mess from the start. Proper planning was sidestepped and statements of requirements were left wanting. Planners ignored the steps required in the DND Project Approval Guide, failed to submit life cycle estimates and, for all intents and purposes, cheated on their homework. Regulations by the dozen were violated. In short, what DND did was go to Boeing and told the supplier, "We'll take fifteen of those. Here, throw on these options", and then fudged the numbers by documenting the basic price of the helicopter without additions. The whole time, there was collusion between DND and PWGS in an attempt to short-circuit the acquisition process. The entire Options Analysis Phase of the project was literally tossed aside.

Earlier the Maritime Shipboard Helicopter project had encountered similar problems. While this was a more mature project and the SOR was reasonably well defined, life cycle costs and in-service support were left undone.

Neither of these projects would surface for the fiascos they were until then-auditor general Shiela Fraser made her report to Parliament in 2010.

The people in the F-35 shop were plugging away well under the radar. However, there was no doubt in the mind of anybody involved that the 2006 MoU was as good as saying the F-35 was a done deal and that would be the next combat aircraft in the RCAF inventory.

In 2008, still without a clear statement of requirements, there was a renewed look at the fighter aircraft on offer. Three were given a solid look: The F-18 Super Hornet; the Typhoon Eurofighter; and the as yet unproven, F-35. All three were compared to a matrix of mandatory performance factors for the next generation fighter. All three met the requirements, even though the F-35 was still under development.

The F-35, untested thought it was, was recommended as the replacement for the F-18s over the other two. The essential reasons given were that it was cheaper, newer, more advanced in the whole and would have a longer service life. None of those reasons were substantiated with any documentation, as the 2012 Auditor General's report lays out.

The RCAF and DND, for their part were convinced that they were in clover as far as the F-35 project went. They, with reasonable confidence, pursued acquisition as though the decision had been made. With the re-election of a Harper minority government in 2008 they felt that, even with the risk of a minority government, they could go for the hardware they wanted and would have little opposition, right up to cabinet level. They felt no need to suddenly start beavering away at a lengthy options analysis when, in their minds anyway, the decision was all but final. True, they had not documented everything required by department regulations, but they had not done it for other projects and these Conservatives didn't seem to mind. It was like Christmas. At least until Shiela Fraser blew the whistle on the two helicopter projects.

Still, as peculiar as the F-35 acquisition appeared, even to those involved in the RCAF, it was thought that the government had approved the way it was going.

On 16 July, 2010, the Harper government announced a soul-source contract with Lockheed Martin to supply 65 F-35A fighters for $16 billion.

That was a lie. There was no contract. But there was pressure from Lockheed Martin.

There was also the same MoU signed in 2006 and updated in December 2009 (considered the 2010 agreement). Despite any other committment, that is the primary document which had Canada tied to the F-35. And while Harper and MacKay were tossing out one set of numbers, the MoU displayed something different.

Canada was still estimating an 80 aircraft acquisition. It was dropped to 65 because of the increasing costs. Further, Canada's contribution to the development had remained the same despite increased development costs. Good deal. But the shrinking acquisition was problematic. A 20 percent slice off the numbers was not supported in any documentation.

And there was still no actual pricetag. At least not one available pubicly. Inside the JSF project office were lodged Canadian participants who had a pretty good reckoning of what the fly-away cost would be.

When Harper refused to provide details of the cost of the F-35 in 2010 there was good reason. The government had substantially low-balled the actual price, left out the life cycle costs and had no material management plan. He faced an election and continued to lie throughout the election campaign. In DND two camps had developed. The larger one was the F-35 adherents; the smaller faction believed a competition would result in competitors to the F-35 offering a much reduced price on the two other possible contenders. MacKay was in possession of that information when he joined in announcing the F-35 as a done deal.

In November 2011 the Standing Committee on Defence heard from another JSF program participant: Norway. Had MPs at that committee been doing anything except collecting a paycheque and building a hefty pension they would have got their calculators out and gone screaming down the corridors. Only one MP knew what questions to ask.

Rear-Admiral Arne Røksund, Head of the Department, Defence Policy and Long-Term Planning, Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway, offered some interesting information. NDP MP Christine Moore asked him:

I want to discuss the F-35 aircraft. You said your budget was realistic. What is your budget for procuring the F-35s?

He told her $10 billion for 51 or 52 aircraft and then added this:

The life cycle costs will be, I think, about—this is not public yet, so I have to be careful—$40 billion U.S. over 30 years. So that's life cycle costs over 30 years, all included.

Assuming the admiral was using the NATO standard that life cycle includes initial acquisition of the asset, at the higher number of aircraft that puts the cost of each aircraft at $769,230,769.23.

Norway's schedule for acquisition is virtually identical to Canada's. The cost to participants, according to the MoU and US law, is that each F-35 will be delivered at the same price at that Then Year to all participants. Ready?

Pricetag, based on the due diligence of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, (which had life cycle costs readily available for a realistic 30 years), for 65 aircraft is exactly $50 billion.

So, $25 billion? And that includes life cycle costs? I think not.Try double that.

Fifty Billion, Andrew. Fifty Billion.

MacKay is "Just an optimistic guy"

#F35 #Cdnpoli - 

Sorry, but part 3 of the F-35 fiasco is still in the hopper. And as much as I am not really a Titanic freak, as someone who understands the effects of hydraulics on sinking ships, there is something I really must watch on ... TV. (Now, I just have to figure out how these button festooned thingies work).

In the meantime, you must watch this. MacKay needs to let his wife take him flying. The thinner air might help him with simple arithmetic. 



And, since she closed comments, (to deal with busy things), I will on this occasion only, skip through a place I rarely choose to tread.  

Sandy, you are completely and utterly hilarious. For a while there I thought you were serious. I have to admit, you had me there for a minute.

You see, I was a part of a major naval acquisition. My team was doing the costing of the training centres that would have to be rebuilt, staffed and operated for the projected life cycle of a particular class of ship. When it was completed, my superiors completed a final LCMM on those centres and then it was included in the final price tag for the ships.

Brilliant work though. Keep it up and keep us in stitches.

H/T

The ballooning cost of the F-35 and MacKay's latest lie

#F35 #Cdnpoli -

Yes, I will be producing part 3 of the F-35 series. It likely won't be available until tomorrow evening.

In the meantime, I cannot let this go by. Andrew Coyne is apparently working on the same project and coming up with roughly the same figures I have so far.

In fact it was reported nearly two years ago by The Globe and Mail, in the same June 11, 2010, story that first stamped what is now conceded to be an incomplete accounting on the public mind. Drawing on “secret cabinet documents,” the paper reported that the total cost of the as-yet-unannounced purchase of 65 jets was not $9-billion, as it had earlier reported, but $16-billion, once maintenance costs of $7-billion over 20 years were factored in. However, way at the bottom of the story there appears this note: “In addition, the government is predicting that the operating costs to fly the stealth fighters over two decades will reach $9.6-billion.”

There it was, all this time, hiding in plain sight. The Globe didn’t realize its significance, and neither did anyone else. It’s clear from the story that the number the government was working with internally was $26-billion. Yet $16-billion became the standard figure in public discussion.

Got that? On a cabinet document. That means that the figures were there in front of MacKay and Harper. That was pre-election, pre-signing of the MoU of 2010. In fact the numbers are higher than that as Coyne points out today and which I will clarify when I complete part 3.

As I pointed out previously, after MacKay was interviewed on Question Period yesterday, his claim that life cycle costs are not included in final purchase price is absolutely bogus. In fact, what he is suggesting was done is in direct violation of Treasury Board directives. Coyne makes the same mention in his article. In fact, here is the extract from the Treasury Board Guide to Management: (My emphasis in text)

3. Life-Cycle Materiel Management

Life-cycle materiel management is the effective and efficient management of assets from the identification of requirements to the disposal of the assets. Materiel management strategies must always consider the full life-cycle costs and benefits of the alternatives for meeting program requirements. By using life-cycle costing techniques, departments can evaluate the total costs to the Crown of owning or leasing an asset before it is acquired. This evaluation is accomplished by considering such factors as the current value of the costs of future operation, maintenance, and disposal, in addition to initial and ongoing capital costs. Estimating life-cycle costs also creates standards by which costs can be monitored and controlled after acquisition. By adopting this approach to the management of materiel, departments can ensure that their materiel management and asset management decisions are financially prudent and represent the best value to the Crown.

The departmental planning phase, which includes business planning and budgeting, is the initial process that determines a department's priorities and strategic program objectives. The materiel life-cycle management process is based on these priorities and objectives.

The extended life of materiel assets has important implications for decision makers. For instance, an acquisition decision that is based on the lowest purchase price but that ignores potential operations and maintenance (O&M) costs may result in higher overall costs. Decision making in life-cycle materiel management is an interactive process that considers all four phases of an asset's life cycle. Effective management requires that an appropriate level of management interest and control be maintained through all phases in the materiel asset's life cycle.

The four phases of life-cycle materiel management are as follows:

1. assessing and planning materiel requirements;
2. acquiring materiel resources;
3. operating, using, and maintaining materiel; and
4. disposing of materiel.

Tip:
The life-cycle cost (LCC) of materiel assets can be expressed by the following simple formula: LCC = planning costs + acquisition costs + use and operating costs + disposal costs - residual value.

And there it is. There's even a "tip" for dummies. Take note of the 3rd phase of the LCMM and LCC.

Coyne picked up on one other thing that will be highlighted later: the life cycle cost projection. The life cycle cost projection for the F-35 is set at 20 years. 

Anyone who has ever been in the Canadian Armed Forces would look at that and ask, "What the ...?!!"

The F-18s are entering their 30th year of service. As it stands now those fighters will likely have to fly for at least another five years, and probably more. We do not dispose of fighters at 20 years. And with an 8000 hour estimated flying life, they will probably be operated for over 36 years.

There will be more coming on that in a later post. However, we should get back to Andrew Coyne's breakdown. 

The life-cycle costs of an asset are those it incurs over the whole of its useful life. Yet Defence’s figures are based on an arbitrary 20-year interval, not on the F-35’s actual projected life. The Parliamentary Budget Officer assesses this at 30 years, while the Auditor-General prefers 36 years. Take the midpoint between the two. Prorate the department’s estimate of operating costs over 33 years rather than 20, and you get a figure of, not $16-billion, but at least $26-billion. Add in acquisition costs of at least $9-billion (and probably more like $10- or $11-billion — but that’s another story), plus the two- or three-billion more the Auditor-General says should be included for attrition, upgrades and the like, and you’re looking at a total cost, all in, of something closer to $40-billion.

Not $9-billion. Not $15- or $16-billion. Not $25-billion. Forty-billion dollars. So far.

Yes. That's roughly the same figure I have. And where did the 20 year LCC come from? Lockheed Martin. 

Later.  

An F-35 Interlude with Peter MacKay

#F35 #cdnpoli

While you wait for the 2nd part of the lies the Harperites told, this should get your blood up.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay says he was aware two years ago that it would cost closer to $25 billion to buy a new fleet of F-35 stealth fighter jets but insists there was never any intention to mislead the public.
That’s about $10 billion more than the nearly $15 billion the government has maintained would be the price of the 65 radar-evading aircraft.
In explaining the discrepancy during an appearance on CTV’s QuestionPeriod, MacKay said Sunday that it was all a matter of a different interpretation of accounting practices.
He said the higher number takes into account the ongoing cost of pilots’ salaries and other costs associated with operating the current fleet of CF-18 jet fighters.
“Yes, and it was explained to me just that way, that the additional $10 billion was money that you could describe as sunk costs — that is, what we’re paying our personnel, and the fuel that is currently being expended in CF-18s, jet fuel, maintenance costs, what we are currently spending. So not part of a new acquisition,” MacKay said.

Better part yet ...

A senior Defence Department official, who would only speak on condition of anonymity, said Sunday the military didn’t want to include the ongoing operating costs of maintaining a fleet of fighters jets because that would have misled Canadians on the true cost of the new jets.
The official said that would allow Canadian taxpayers “to think we delivered a lot more plane than what we actually are delivering.”
The official said the military’s hand was forced by the auditor general, so now those costs will be included in this and future procurements.
“Governments don’t do this simply so we don’t mislead Canadians. Now we’re being accused of misleading Canadians because we haven’t put that out there,” the official said.
“Any soccer mom in the country knows that their purchase of a mini van does not include gas over 20 years or a salary for driving it.”
MacKay said it has never been the practice to include such things as salaries, fuel costs “or the cost of keeping that existing equipment running” in the price of a new capital procurement.

Oh dear. Somebody has been reading my mail.  Excuse me while I clear this up a little. As anyone who read my previous posting now knows, MacKay and his senior department official are full of shit.

All military capital acquisitions include all costs related to LCC. If you don't, you end up with a nice shiny airplane that never leaves the ground. Further, the estimate DND hung out is chock full of missing life cycle cost items.

They can't stop lying.

They also seem hung up on the "We didn't spend any money yet, so it's all OK" meme.

Thundering in on the F-35 Boondoggle - foreword

I've been wading through piles of paper. Some of it is recent correspondence received after the Auditor General's report on the unbelievable mess that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has become. Other material has been out there for a while.

Later on today, (hopefully), we'll examine what the costs were known to be for the F-35 JSF, long before Harper and his minions decided to lie and feed the Canadian public a bill of goods.

First though, lets look at a definition you should have planted in your mind: Life Cycle Cost. (LCC)

The Harperites have been pushing a talking point that the figures they were feeding the Canadian public before, during and after the last election did not include full life cycle costs. From a procurement standpoint, that is simply ludicrous. From my own experience, nobody ever procures capital equipment for the military unless a complete life cycle cost analysis is done and a thorough life cycle cost estimate is produced. The following is from a current publication in use for military project personnel working on LCC for aquisitions:

Life-cycle cost (LCC) can be defined as the total cost to the government of a program over its full life, including costs for research and development; testing; production; facilities; operations; maintenance; personnel; environmental compliance; and disposal.

For a better idea of what all that involves, take a look at this from MTain. (Good idea to read the page on that link. Great comparison on buying a car vs buying a military aircraft)

 

Now, if you want to look at something even more graphic, educational and understandable, go here.  That is using an iceberg, most of which is underwater, to show that the acquisition cost is much less than the overall life cycle cost. 

The Harper talking points that their figures did not include wages, fuel and training are nothing more than the desperate flinging of poo. An equipment acquisition always includes those estimates in the total life cycle cost. That's how you manage your defence budget over the life of your equipment. (Any good fiscal manager knows that, but hey! We're talking about Harper here.)

With that information, it's now time to head on over to The Gazetteer. RossK has put up this morning's interview on CBC The House with the Auditor General and then the weaselly Chris Alexander, parliamentary secretary to the minister of national defence.

Listen closely because that is your primer for my next post.

Later. 

There it is. They are all a pack of liars

Harper and all his cabinet ministers involved in the F-35 deal are liars.

If Auditor General Michael Ferguson's word is to be believed — and there is no reason to think that it isn't — then the federal cabinet and by extension the prime minister, and not just the anonymous gnomes in the Department of National Defence, are directly on the hook for the F-35 boondoggle, in the most egregious sense.

They knew before the last federal election that the jets would cost billions more than had been stated by DND — at least $10-billion more, around $25.1-billion. They allowed the department to publicly table an estimate of $14.7-billion.

"I can't speak to individuals who knew it, but it was information that was prepared by National Defence," Ferguson told reporters Thursday. "It's certainly my understanding that that would have been information that, yes, the government would have had."

He continued: "That $25-billion number was something I think that at that time was known to government." And, critically: "It would have been primarily members of the executive, yes."

So, this is no longer a matter of "it happened on their watch." It's a matter of whether there was outright deception, deliberate and premeditated, during an election campaign, on an issue of great national import, by the prime minister and members of the cabinet.

I knew that. I said it yesterday. As I pointed out, it would have been near impossible for the military to have produced a set of numbers so totally skewed as to be unbelievable. The information available through a myriad of public sources before the last election provided estimates on purchase cost alone that put the figures Harper was offering to the lie. Of course, there's more.

Ferguson's remarks do not occur in a vacuum: to anyone familiar with the inner workings of DND, they will ring true. DND Deputy Minister Robert Fonberg and assistant deputy minister (materiel) Dan Ross typically handled matters related to the F-35 procurement. It was standard practice for all information on major procurements, including costing, to be passed on to the inner cabinet. It is highly unlikely, on its face, that anything as important as these numbers would have been withheld from the PMO.

And more. (Emphasis mine)

The initial estimate of $75-million (U.S.) per plane did not include the cost of drag chutes for landing on short runways, or modifications to the refuelling system that DND knew would be necessary. But more important, the estimates of life-cycle costs — including the higher and real number of $25.1 billion, which DND and apparently the cabinet withheld — were for 20 years only. 

"This practice understates operating, personnel, and sustainment costs, as well as some capital costs, because the time period is shorter than the aircraft's estimated life expectancy. The JSF Program Office provided National Defence with projected sustainment costs over 36 years."

Got that? The JSF Program Office is the fact clearing house to all countries involved in the F-35 development project. Undiddled numbers that got diddled somewhere up the line. And those numbers would only be projected maintenance and sustainability costs. In a procurement, such as a US FMS case, it is up to the end-user country to ADD operating, personnel and unique modification costs.

Top all of this off with the shucking and jiving of Rona Ambrose. She too, is a liar.

Bob Rae not only noticed, he handed the government a bomb with a short, burning fuse.

And now, I have to digest some information I have acquired. Some past comrades-in-arms are furious and before they let themselves get hit by an oncoming bus, they intend to stop it before it gets to them.

Before I get to that though, I would like you to consider this. Remember when Ibbitson wrote this about Harper and others in relation to electoral fraud in the last federal election?

As a general rule, politicians never openly lie, because the consequences of being caught in one just aren’t worth it. (Think Watergate, Monica Lewinsky.) Neither of these men would take that risk.

We have absolutely no further reason to accept that premise in any way. Harper is a liar; his minister of national defence is a liar; his associate minister of national defence is a liar; and his minister of public works is a liar. 

Hands up if you think Harper didn't know about the voter suppression effort in May 2011. Because he says he didn't?

Right. Thought so.

Later.

Stevie augers in . . .

Finally ... they drop the gloves

The Disaffected Lib wants the Governor General to intervene. He links to the latest offerings by Andrew Coyne and Brian Stewart who lay out exhibits which should horrify any Canadian.

Coyne:

This was, until last year's shipbuilding contract, the largest single purchase in the country's history. And yet it was carried out, as we now learn, without proper documentation, without accurate data, and without any of the normal procurement rules being followed. Defence officials simply decided in advance which aircraft they wanted, and that was that. Guidelines were evaded, Parliament was lied to, and in the end the people of Canada were set to purchase planes that may or may not be able to do the job set out for them, years after they were supposed to be delivered, at twice the promised cost.

But of course it's much worse than that. If department officials played two successive ministers of defence, Gordon O'Connor and Peter MacKay, for fools, the evidence shows they did not have to exert themselves much; if they did not offer evidence to back their claims, whether on performance, costs, or risks, it is because ministers did not think to ask for any. Nor was this negligence confined to the Department of National Defence.

And he concludes with ...

So this is also what comes of Parliament's prerogatives, its powers to hold ministers to account, being ignored or overridden. These aren't procedural niceties, of concern only to constitutional law professors — "process issues," as more than one member of the press gallery sneered at the time. They're the vital bulwarks of self-government, the only means we have of ensuring our wishes are obeyed and our money isn't wasted. Parliament having long ago lost control of the public purse, it was only a matter of time before the government did as well.

It's good of Coyne to finally recognize the clear and present danger to this country's parliamentary democracy. We have been filling these pages with warnings of such impending events for years.

Be careful, Andrew. Someone will accuse you of being "reactionary" or "hyperbolic". And I might point out that the people who accused the writers here of those things have not returned to call us what we actually were: right all along.

Stewart:

The who-knew-what about the real costs of the F-35 fighter jet Canada wants to purchase is worrisome enough. But at the heart of the fiasco is a far more serious concern about what public honesty means to this government.

It's a sad state that few Canadians appear surprised by the auditor general's findings that Parliament was kept in the dark over the real costs of this program and what looks to be a $10-billion overrun.
Many seem to assume that misleading and denying whenever it suits is a government's normal default position. After all, this government seems to have done it for years on Afghanistan and with its other problems in national defence.

In my own attempts to unravel the F-35's real costs I never once met a single soul outside government and knowledgeable about defence purchases who believed the prime minister's promise that the planes could be delivered for a bargain-rate $75 million each.

I never met anyone inside the Canadian military who thought so either.

I'm sure thousands in the aviation industry who follow these programs, especially in the U.S. and Europe, simply assumed Ottawa was dealing in fairy tales for public consumption, from which it refused to budge.

This is why we need to see if this current mess is part of a pattern of official "misstatements" on defence matters. If so, we've got a serious national problem.

Brian Stewart has been on the beat for longer than I can remember. His article should be read in its entirety because he goes on to describe the obsessive secrecy in which the Harperites surround themselves on all things. But the highlight was the continued attempt to suppress information on the Afghanistan adventure.

Unlike Coyne, Stewart never offered us Harper as a "good thing". He just kept chipping away at things that seemed to exist in the strange shadows of the Harper government.

This trend towards denial makes everything about the misstated F-35 billions a deeply serious affair.

We really need to know how deep the deception went in this case. And we ought to be much more curious about what is being carried out in our names under the cloak of secrecy.

Yes, we do.

And we need to know who knew what when back in May of 2011, when thousands of calls went out misdirecting voters to bogus polling stations. 

The rumbling and shaking at 101 Colonel By Drive

I was all prepared to post exactly what I thought about the Auditor General's report with respect to the the procurement of ... any number ... of F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters. And I was going to conclude that all the fault with the total cluster-fuck that this procurement has become lies in the lap of one person: Peter MacKay.

Then the editorial board of the Ottawa Citizen released a salvo fit for a major newspaper. All except for one little problem, but we'll get to that shortly.

It is the Department of National Defence that failed, in the auditor general’s estimation, to exercise due diligence and properly inform Parliament. But it is the minister’s duty to make sure that department does its job, especially when billions are on the line. It’s the minister’s job to ask questions, to be sure of his ground before he stands up and invokes the protection of Canadian troops in the service of his opinion.

It is the minister who is, oh, what’s that old-fashioned word … responsible.

Peter MacKay either didn’t know what his department was up to, or he was complicit in keeping the whole truth from his fellow parliamentarians and from Canadians.

To be fair to MacKay, there are others who ought to be ashamed of themselves. The auditor general’s latest report says the year 2006 “represented the most critical period concerning Canada’s participation in the (Joint Strike Fighter) Program and future acquisition of the F-35.” Gordon O’Connor was the defence minister at that time. That’s when Canada accepted the procurement regime and signed memorandums of understanding with manufacturers Lockheed Martin, Pratt & Whitney and GE Rolls-Royce.

The next year, MacKay took over the portfolio, and he has been a staunch defender of the F-35 process since. In 2010, the government announced it was buying the F-35. It was after this announcement that the defence department went through the required process to justify its decision to buy the planes without holding a competition.

And it goes on. This part is particularly delightful. (Empasis mine)

Both MacKay and Prime Minister Stephen Harper were stubbornly insisting, in 2010 and 2011, that this was a done deal and that there was no other good way to replace the CF-18s. They insisted that the costs of the F-35s were known and transparent, and they repeatedly used phrases such as “rip up the contract” or “cancel the contract” to characterize the opposition position.

There was no contract, as Harper and his cabinet — especially beleaguered junior defence minister Julian Fantino, who is taking all the heat off MacKay on this issue — are now eager to emphasize.

The big lie. And, the big tell.

Both MacKay and Harper knew, when they were attempting to smear the opposition as attempting to "deny the troops" necessary equipment, that there was something wrong with their numbers. They had long been alerted to it by both the parliamentary budget officer and by their own technical advisers. Their refusal to provide a comprehensive cost estimate to parliament was unprecedented and telling. The Harper government was held in contempt of parliament because of Harper's propensity to childish temper tantrums whenever the high court of the people held him to account.
 
And the whole time they knew that there was something wrong with their numbers. Had they been in any way confident in the numbers they were spouting publicly, they would have tossed the details on the bar and gloated while the opposition choked on them.

But they didn't do that. They kept hiding behind "contracts" which did not exist, peppered with "we are the only ones who support the troops".

Anybody who has been anywhere near the military procurement game saw this whole process as a little odd. For one thing, this was an unknown platform. Most of us thought this whole thing required a closer look and a huge amount of "requirements" work, and we said so.

That got some hackles up.

The Harper spin machine was hard at work, (because we had questioned His decision), and before we knew it, self-styled "military analysts", (most of whom don't know whether they are punched, bored or blown out with a twin 3 inch 70 naval gun mount), were telling us that this air weapons platform was the neatest thing since the invention of sex.

And, it's what the air force wanted.

Bully for them. Even the adults in the RCAF know that they have to fly and fight what the government provides, whether they want it or not.

Most Canadians can be excused for their erroneous belief that the uniformed Canadian Armed Forces and the civilian Department of National Defence are the same thing. Despite the obvious close relationship, they are separate, as required by law. So take this breakout of responsibilities seriously:

[T]he Department is headed by a Deputy Minister of National Defence, the Department’s senior civil servant, while the Canadian Forces are headed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada’s senior serving officer.  Both are responsible to the Minister.

• The Deputy Minister has responsibility for policy, resources, interdepartmental coordination and international defence relations; and
• The Chief of the Defence Staff has responsibility for command, control and administration of the Canadian Forces and military strategy, plans and requirements.

Once, a long time ago, a Chief of the Defence Staff went to the Minister of National Defence and told him that the armed services were in desperate need of more people to meet the requirements of the government's stated defence policy. The MND went to the DM who told him that the budget would not allow any increase in pay, training and support of anything higher than the cabinet approved established strength. The CDS then told the minister that he could no longer generate the forces needed to meet a contingency operation, but thanks for hearing me. The CDS, one of the most highly decorated Canadian combat veterans to have held the position, responded to media, (hoping to be able to report on a pig-fight), "I am a soldier. I salute, turn about and do my best."

I, personally, was young, pissed-off and demoralized by that statement. But I also learned something that day. We in uniform do not decide such things. We use what we are provided. We don't make the final decisions on ships, tanks, aircraft, rifles, ammunition, uniforms, underwear or the quality of issue nylon stockings. All of that is decided by The Department. And The Department is subject to the will of those higher in the food chain.

There has been a generally loud response to the Auditor General's report, much of which aims at unnamed people in the RCAF and the uniformed Canadian Forces. It is suggested that they lied, covered up, fudged numbers and misled an otherwise hapless, albeit incompetent minister.

That would be a great story. Except that they couldn't do it. The lines, as described above, are very clear. The air force can get on their knees and beg for F-35s until the cows come home. They can tell The Department, right up to the minister, that no other airplane will meet their needs. It is not, as I have pointed out, their decision. That rests with the civilian policy and resources shop of The Department.

I was present, way back in time, when the lords of the navy were briefing the Minister of National Defence on the requirement to replace the Oberon-class submarines. The admirals had several options, all of which involved conventionally-powered boats: two off-the-shelf types and one cooperative build-in-Canada model. The minister asked why there was not a nuclear-propelled option. The admirals were shocked but answered that current defence policy did not include the demand for that type of boat, and the uniformed navy felt that nuclear-powered submarines would be politically unacceptable.

The minister answered with, "The politics are not your problem. Come back with a nuclear option."

The admirals were uncomfortable since nuclear propulsion involved a massive shift in focus and, as they pointed out, was outside the limits of the stated defence policy.

I'll let you look up the history but it was a Conservative minister and it sheds a light on the F-35 issue.

The type of equipment the armed services employ is decided by the politicians. The Canadian taxpayer is buying it all. The armed services makes the best use of it, preserves it, become experts with it and hopes for a new model - soon. They don't pick it. They only get to say what they would really, really like.

Remember the Harper line after he formed his first minority government? He was going to streamline military procurement. After his 2nd minority he decided to make it a part of his agenda. The 2008 Speech from the Throne contained this:

Fixing procurement will be a top priority. Simpler and streamlined processes will make it easier for businesses to provide products and services to the government and will deliver better results for Canadians. Military procurement in particular is critical: Canada cannot afford to have cumbersome processes delay the purchase and delivery of equipment needed by our men and women in uniform.

That seems to be a Conservative goddamned mantra.

What Harper pumped out of the mouth of the Governor General can easily be summarized as this: We don't need to put every purchase under a microscope when the answer is obvious. We spend too much time analysing expensive capital military equipment. We already know what we want. We're just going to go out and buy the stuff we want. A competition is a waste of time.

And that is exactly what they did. Harper and MacKay. Who needs a cumbersome competition and assessment process when we have THEM. They are all wise.

The Auditor General did point a finger. He pointed it at the civilian-led policy shop. The policy shop led by Harper and MacKay.

Both should depart without their heads. That, however, is unlikely to happen.

I reckon some poor unsuspecting corporal will have her or his life ruined to preserve the image of Harper infallibility.

Watch the Auditor General on April 3rd

Watch very closely. The AG zeroed in on the F-35 Lightning II project and draft of the Spring report to Parliament was delivered to departments and ministries.

Today, sackcloth and ashes were being issued at 101 Colonel By Drive and some people were falling on their swords.

Auditor General Michael Ferguson is preparing to blast the Department of National Defence for its handling of the F-35 stealth fighter program in a report to be released next month, the National Post is reporting.

The first draft of the report has been delivered to the department and is said to accuse the military of misleading Parliament, according to sources who have spoken to the newspaper.

Which means the prime minister, the defence minister and the associate defence minister misled parliament. 

A source tells me there is a lot of dust flying around in the F-35 project office. That will be from blowing off what would have been competing bids --- if there had been a competition.

Squirming in the F-35's expensive seat

I you'll recall, anyone who questioned the Harperite rock-solid, give-no-ground commitment to purchase 65 F-35 Lightning II fighters, was labeled an unpatriotic, troop-hating, surrender monkey. That's because the Harperites aren't, and they only buy the best for our boys and girls in light blue.

Until the price goes up. (Emphasis mine)

"We have not as yet discounted, the possibility, of course, of backing out of any of the program," Fantino, associate minister of national defence, told the House defence committee Tuesday.

"None of the partners have. We are not. And we’ll just have to think it through further as time goes on, but we are confident that we will not leave Canada or our men and women in uniform in a lurch, but it’s hypothetical to go any further right now."

Fantino also said the government won't decide on the purchase until it knows how much it will cost.

Hey! The music's stopped. Someone's not going to get a chair!

As countries all over the world balk at the skyrocketing cost of the F-35 it took this long for the Rideau Canal tree-house club to figure out that buying the world's most expensive flying weapons platform might just not be a bright idea.

Pass the Oreos and let's see how we get down from here now that someone stole the rope ladder.

"We will be expending the allotted amount, $9 billion, for the acquisition if we are going to go there," he said.

"That decision will be made if and when those factors are known to us and the decision will be made as to whether or not Canada will actually enter into a contract to purchase the F-35."

But, but ...

"One of the things that I know for certain is that Canada remains involved in the joint strike fighter program," Fantino said.

"The decision, the determinate decision, has not as yet been made as to whether or not we are going to actually purchase, buy, acquire, the F-35."

Hey! Just hold it there a minute. The participation in the project was committed to by a previous Liberal government (which you all tried to use a defence of your position) and you kept telling everyone that it was tied to a commitment to purchase. So did Lockheed Martin.

This is starting to look like the big-talk days of Brian Mulroney. You might remember, he produced a Defence White Paper full of grandiose ideas and a plan to totally re-equip the armed forces. Almost none of it happened.

But his biggest idea, the one on which he refused to back down, the one which he said was only going to cost a whopping $10 billion, started its death spiral in much the same way, with similar statements to those of Fantino on the F-35.

Je me souviens des sous-marins nucléaires.

The F-35 Fugue (2) . . .

— Dassault Rafale —

450 MILLION DOLLARS EACH, somewhere around that, is the cost of acquisition and service of Canuck F-35's over their projected lifespan, for a total around 30 billion dollars. OUCH!

It could have been cheaper. At least, that's what WIRED thinks, according to Michael Moran's article, "How Do You Say "Top Gun" in French?". A couple of weeks back, I posted that the Indian government had decided to buy Dassault Rafale jet fighters. This is a major triumph for France, achieving its first foreign sale of the Rafale. Now, we know a little more.

There was a selection process, and the Indians winnowed out the F-18 Super Hornet and the MiG-35 early on, even though the F-18 is thought to be an equal for the Rafale in the mission-critical envelope, and the price was right.

Now, regardless of country, the mystery of military hardware procurement is a blend of budget, national ego and politics, both domestic and international. After the American F-18 rejection, the British were still hanging tough, offering the Eurofighter Typhoon, but the French government offered a sweeter deal.

Maybe, the Indians were miffed that they were not offered an export version of the F-35 by the Americans? It's like having someone say, "We don't trust you." Consider:

The F-35 Lightning has already been sold to Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the British (for the Royal Navy). Under what bizarre scenario did the U.S. military foresee its sale to India posing a threat to American national security? Pakistani sensibilities? If nothing else, the additional aircraft on the production lines might have helped bring down the ridiculous price of the F-35 program over time. 

Hey, it's only money, but the extra production sure would have been nice. Of course, we got Stevie and Airshow riding herd on it, what could possibly go wrong?

The F-35 Fugue . . .

— the F-35 Fugue —

THIS JUST KEEPS GETTING BETTER: according to DEFENCETECH "Did Chinese Espionage Lead to F-35 Delays?", that's what happened.

Chinese spies apparently hacked into secure conference calls and listened to meetings discussing the classified technologies aboard the jets. In particular, China may have stolen info about the F-35’s secure communications and antenna systems; leading to costly software rewrites and other redesigns to compromised parts of the plane.

The worst part, this problem isn’t just limited to the F-35, though the program’s size and the fact that it’s information systems were apparently designed without any concern for cyber espionage made it an easy target.

All those cost over-runs hurt, but giving the other side an insight as to how you think about things, as well as design approaches and methods, oh boy. As far as the Chinese are concerned, not quite priceless, but large, as they can make a large jump in capability more quickly.

Caveat emptor . . .

THE LAST F-22 HAS BEEN BUILT. According to David Axe, at WIRED, in an article, "Buyer’s Remorse: How Much Has the F-22 Really Cost?". Scary stuff:

So what’s the cost? As little as $137 million per jet and as much as $678 million, depending on how and what you count. The thing is, the best way of calculating the F-22′s cost may be the most abstract. But any way you crunch the numbers, the world’s best dogfighter has also been one of the most expensive operational warplanes ever.

OUCH! So, why should you care? Well, the article has an interesting comment on the F-35:

By contrast, the F-35′s unit cost should stabilize at around $157 million, owing to a massive 2,443-plane production run. That’s assuming the Joint Strike Fighter doesn’t get canceled or curtailed following revelations of new design flaws.

• • •

F-35 lifecycle plus unit cost, assuming nothing else goes wrong? $469 million, according to Air Force figures quoted by the GAO.

So: F-35's are going to be around 157 million dollars a piece, and almost $500 million EACH over their service-time? The Super Hornet gets better and better.