The rumbling and shaking at 101 Colonel By Drive

I was all prepared to post exactly what I thought about the Auditor General's report with respect to the the procurement of ... any number ... of F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters. And I was going to conclude that all the fault with the total cluster-fuck that this procurement has become lies in the lap of one person: Peter MacKay.

Then the editorial board of the Ottawa Citizen released a salvo fit for a major newspaper. All except for one little problem, but we'll get to that shortly.

It is the Department of National Defence that failed, in the auditor general’s estimation, to exercise due diligence and properly inform Parliament. But it is the minister’s duty to make sure that department does its job, especially when billions are on the line. It’s the minister’s job to ask questions, to be sure of his ground before he stands up and invokes the protection of Canadian troops in the service of his opinion.

It is the minister who is, oh, what’s that old-fashioned word … responsible.

Peter MacKay either didn’t know what his department was up to, or he was complicit in keeping the whole truth from his fellow parliamentarians and from Canadians.

To be fair to MacKay, there are others who ought to be ashamed of themselves. The auditor general’s latest report says the year 2006 “represented the most critical period concerning Canada’s participation in the (Joint Strike Fighter) Program and future acquisition of the F-35.” Gordon O’Connor was the defence minister at that time. That’s when Canada accepted the procurement regime and signed memorandums of understanding with manufacturers Lockheed Martin, Pratt & Whitney and GE Rolls-Royce.

The next year, MacKay took over the portfolio, and he has been a staunch defender of the F-35 process since. In 2010, the government announced it was buying the F-35. It was after this announcement that the defence department went through the required process to justify its decision to buy the planes without holding a competition.

And it goes on. This part is particularly delightful. (Empasis mine)

Both MacKay and Prime Minister Stephen Harper were stubbornly insisting, in 2010 and 2011, that this was a done deal and that there was no other good way to replace the CF-18s. They insisted that the costs of the F-35s were known and transparent, and they repeatedly used phrases such as “rip up the contract” or “cancel the contract” to characterize the opposition position.

There was no contract, as Harper and his cabinet — especially beleaguered junior defence minister Julian Fantino, who is taking all the heat off MacKay on this issue — are now eager to emphasize.

The big lie. And, the big tell.

Both MacKay and Harper knew, when they were attempting to smear the opposition as attempting to "deny the troops" necessary equipment, that there was something wrong with their numbers. They had long been alerted to it by both the parliamentary budget officer and by their own technical advisers. Their refusal to provide a comprehensive cost estimate to parliament was unprecedented and telling. The Harper government was held in contempt of parliament because of Harper's propensity to childish temper tantrums whenever the high court of the people held him to account.
 
And the whole time they knew that there was something wrong with their numbers. Had they been in any way confident in the numbers they were spouting publicly, they would have tossed the details on the bar and gloated while the opposition choked on them.

But they didn't do that. They kept hiding behind "contracts" which did not exist, peppered with "we are the only ones who support the troops".

Anybody who has been anywhere near the military procurement game saw this whole process as a little odd. For one thing, this was an unknown platform. Most of us thought this whole thing required a closer look and a huge amount of "requirements" work, and we said so.

That got some hackles up.

The Harper spin machine was hard at work, (because we had questioned His decision), and before we knew it, self-styled "military analysts", (most of whom don't know whether they are punched, bored or blown out with a twin 3 inch 70 naval gun mount), were telling us that this air weapons platform was the neatest thing since the invention of sex.

And, it's what the air force wanted.

Bully for them. Even the adults in the RCAF know that they have to fly and fight what the government provides, whether they want it or not.

Most Canadians can be excused for their erroneous belief that the uniformed Canadian Armed Forces and the civilian Department of National Defence are the same thing. Despite the obvious close relationship, they are separate, as required by law. So take this breakout of responsibilities seriously:

[T]he Department is headed by a Deputy Minister of National Defence, the Department’s senior civil servant, while the Canadian Forces are headed by the Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada’s senior serving officer.  Both are responsible to the Minister.

• The Deputy Minister has responsibility for policy, resources, interdepartmental coordination and international defence relations; and
• The Chief of the Defence Staff has responsibility for command, control and administration of the Canadian Forces and military strategy, plans and requirements.

Once, a long time ago, a Chief of the Defence Staff went to the Minister of National Defence and told him that the armed services were in desperate need of more people to meet the requirements of the government's stated defence policy. The MND went to the DM who told him that the budget would not allow any increase in pay, training and support of anything higher than the cabinet approved established strength. The CDS then told the minister that he could no longer generate the forces needed to meet a contingency operation, but thanks for hearing me. The CDS, one of the most highly decorated Canadian combat veterans to have held the position, responded to media, (hoping to be able to report on a pig-fight), "I am a soldier. I salute, turn about and do my best."

I, personally, was young, pissed-off and demoralized by that statement. But I also learned something that day. We in uniform do not decide such things. We use what we are provided. We don't make the final decisions on ships, tanks, aircraft, rifles, ammunition, uniforms, underwear or the quality of issue nylon stockings. All of that is decided by The Department. And The Department is subject to the will of those higher in the food chain.

There has been a generally loud response to the Auditor General's report, much of which aims at unnamed people in the RCAF and the uniformed Canadian Forces. It is suggested that they lied, covered up, fudged numbers and misled an otherwise hapless, albeit incompetent minister.

That would be a great story. Except that they couldn't do it. The lines, as described above, are very clear. The air force can get on their knees and beg for F-35s until the cows come home. They can tell The Department, right up to the minister, that no other airplane will meet their needs. It is not, as I have pointed out, their decision. That rests with the civilian policy and resources shop of The Department.

I was present, way back in time, when the lords of the navy were briefing the Minister of National Defence on the requirement to replace the Oberon-class submarines. The admirals had several options, all of which involved conventionally-powered boats: two off-the-shelf types and one cooperative build-in-Canada model. The minister asked why there was not a nuclear-propelled option. The admirals were shocked but answered that current defence policy did not include the demand for that type of boat, and the uniformed navy felt that nuclear-powered submarines would be politically unacceptable.

The minister answered with, "The politics are not your problem. Come back with a nuclear option."

The admirals were uncomfortable since nuclear propulsion involved a massive shift in focus and, as they pointed out, was outside the limits of the stated defence policy.

I'll let you look up the history but it was a Conservative minister and it sheds a light on the F-35 issue.

The type of equipment the armed services employ is decided by the politicians. The Canadian taxpayer is buying it all. The armed services makes the best use of it, preserves it, become experts with it and hopes for a new model - soon. They don't pick it. They only get to say what they would really, really like.

Remember the Harper line after he formed his first minority government? He was going to streamline military procurement. After his 2nd minority he decided to make it a part of his agenda. The 2008 Speech from the Throne contained this:

Fixing procurement will be a top priority. Simpler and streamlined processes will make it easier for businesses to provide products and services to the government and will deliver better results for Canadians. Military procurement in particular is critical: Canada cannot afford to have cumbersome processes delay the purchase and delivery of equipment needed by our men and women in uniform.

That seems to be a Conservative goddamned mantra.

What Harper pumped out of the mouth of the Governor General can easily be summarized as this: We don't need to put every purchase under a microscope when the answer is obvious. We spend too much time analysing expensive capital military equipment. We already know what we want. We're just going to go out and buy the stuff we want. A competition is a waste of time.

And that is exactly what they did. Harper and MacKay. Who needs a cumbersome competition and assessment process when we have THEM. They are all wise.

The Auditor General did point a finger. He pointed it at the civilian-led policy shop. The policy shop led by Harper and MacKay.

Both should depart without their heads. That, however, is unlikely to happen.

I reckon some poor unsuspecting corporal will have her or his life ruined to preserve the image of Harper infallibility.

Mackay tries to slide one two through

Finally!! The long overdue Harper defence document suddenly pops up on the DND website. Surprizingly, it sort of crept up there after more than a month of Harperite Muskox calls announcing all kinds of things with no money to match.

Then, late last night, just before Parliament recesses, it makes an appearance.

Peter MacKay says he was merely providing more details on the government's defence strategy when his department quietly posted the price tag on its website late Thursday night.

The minister of defence, who was at an international conference in Halifax today, says the plan amounts to $490 billion in spending over 20 years.

The funding includes $20 billion for new aircraft, tanks and ships, in addition to $15 billion in transport planes, trucks and helicopters that had been purchased earlier.

The Canada First Defence Strategy was first introduced by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in Halifax last month amid claims that the funding was unclear and incorrect.

Let's see... either MacKay is playing loose with the truth or my sources are. I've been told this was ready to be announced some time ago but that any public announcement was a political decision and the CF was ordered not to post it.

My sources have no reason to lie. MacKay has a poor record with the truth. Not only that, when I first saw this announcement the date on the website was 18 June 2008. It's since changed to 20 June. But all that is irrelevant; we finally have the Defence Policy document that Harper promised to deliver within 6 months of taking office.

Depending on your point of view, $490 billion is either horrendously large or it isn't enough.
Further, the Canada First Defence Strategy reads as much like a political campaign instrument as it does a guide for the future employment, equipping and managing of Canada's armed services.

The 22-page document is sprinkled with all kinds of little rhetorical tidbits which do less to rationally explain the strategy and a lot to demonstrate Conservative penis envy.

From page 2 (Harper's message):

... Canada can return to the international stage as a credible and influential country, ready to do its part.

Typical of Harper, he ignores Canada's influence on the international stage as a trusted honest broker. To him the "international stage" is a military force - period. This blinkered view has reduced our influence as a nation since the only "part" he's willing to do is support Bush administration military fiascoes.

Page 4:

The infusion of long-term stable funding it provides will enable industry to reach for global excellence and to be better positioned to compete for defence contracts at home and abroad...

How does this reconcile with General Dynamics withdrawing its bid from the Frigate Life Extension Project because of lack of funding and the likelihood that GD is probably going to sue the Canadian government? Great start.

This strengthened military will translate into enhanced security for Canadians at home as well as a stronger voice for Canada on the world stage.

There's that "world stage" line again. Damn the Harperites put a lot of stock in that.

Something very strange appears on page 5. After describing natural disasters which occurred in Canada over the past decade in which the Canadian Forces provided an immediate response, the natural inclination of the Harperites floats up.

As Hurricane Katrina has shown in the United States, such disasters will continue to occur, often with devastating consequences, and the citizens affected will expect immediate responses.

Hurricane Katrina?! What would possess any Canadian government to use that as an example. Why refer to it at all? Unless that line was written by an American - an American unfamiliar with the effects of Hurricane Juan on Halifax.

Page 6: (Emphasis mine)

Canada Command was created in 2006 to provide a single operational authority for such domestic operations and will work closely with federal departments such as Public Safety Canada in responding to a natural disaster or a terrorist attack.

In short, that last emphasis was written for the pants-pissers. The said terrorist attack will be over before anyone responds.

On page 8 this line emerges: (Emphasis mine)

... the two nations’ armed forces [Canadian and US] will pursue their effective collaboration on operations in North America and abroad. To remain interoperable, we must ensure that key aspects of our equipment and doctrine are compatible.

Abroad? The Canadian Forces have always maintained a doctrine of being interoperable with NATO. This, however, will provide a convenient point at which a Canadian frigate can remain a part of an American naval strike group even if it's attacking, oh, say, Iran.

Page 9:

Providing international leadership is vital if Canada is to continue to be a credible player on the world stage.

Not to mention sending kids home in metal coffins. Funny how that "world stage" doesn't seem to include anything but expeditionary wars.

This will require the Canadian Forces to have the necessary capabilities to make a meaningful contribution across the full spectrum of international operations, from humanitarian assistance to stabilization operations to combat.

Agreed! All of that is completely accurate and rational. So why then, in the rest of that subject is nothing but combat mentioned? The only example provided is that of Afghanistan. Where are the peace enforcement and peacekeeping probabilities addressed?

They're not.

Perhaps most telling of all though is the numbers provided on page 12. New Major Fleet Replacements roll out at $20 billion for 17 new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, 15 new destroyers and frigates for the navy, 10 - 12 new maritime patrol aircraft, 65 next-generation fighter aircraft for the air force, and a mix of new combat vehicles and systems for the army.

Really?! Are they planning on having them built out of Lego blocks? New ships alone will exceed that entire figure. And the fine print tells an interesting story. The actual number is up to $45 billion higher than what is being shown. That makes the $490 billion bottom line closer to $535 billion. The attempt to state that "new" equipment would have a life beyond the 20-year capital equipment plan says nothing. Yes, if you buy it at the end of the program it will last, (hopefully), beyond the period of the program; and so will the extended costs.

There is another little item which, as a result of another development, becomes even more curious. From page 20:

... the Canada First Defence Strategy represents a significant investment in the country’s industry, knowledge and technology sectors that will yield sizeable dividends for every region of the country. This clear, long-term plan will give these sectors the opportunity to better position themselves to compete for defence contracts in Canada and in the global marketplace.

If that's the case, perhaps Peter MacKay can explain this.

Members of the U.S. Congress have been told the Canadian government plans to spend $114 million on new howitzers to contribute to the war on terror while parliamentarians at home have been kept in the dark over the deal.

[...]

Neither the Defence Department nor Public Works released details on the howitzer deal, but Congress was told Wednesday about the pending sale.

Under American government accountability rules, the U.S. Defense Security Co-operation Agency must tell Congress of upcoming sales of weaponry. That information is also made public.

The estimated cost is $114 million, according to the security co-operation agency.

[...]

U.S. firms in Mississippi and in Michigan will provide the equipment.

There are no offset agreements in place for the sale, which means that the U.S. companies aren't required to provide industrial benefits to Canadian firms.

Oh yes... it's confirmed. Explain MacKay.

And it still looks like an American had a hand in writing Harper's new defence strategy.

The debate will drag on until it's over, General. It's not up to you.

Why is Rick Hillier commenting publicly on the parliamentary agenda?

Canada's top soldier urged Parliament to come to a quick decision on the country's role in Afghanistan, warning that lengthy debate may put soldiers increasingly at risk as the Taliban take advantage of the uncertainty. "We are, in the eyes of the Taliban, in a window of extreme vulnerability, and the longer we go without that clarity, with the issue in doubt, the more the Taliban will target us as a perceived weak link," Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier said Friday.

It's all very well and good to advise the political leaders of this country of that fact, in the confines of an office; it is another thing to be making public statements suggesting Parliament do anything at all. One is his job; the other is a step over the line.

Rick Hillier, Canadian citizen, has the right to an opinion like everyone else, however, he is a sworn servant of the Crown and when he speaks he does so from a privileged platform. As principle military advisor to the government, he is fully aware that when he stands and speaks, in full uniform, he attracts attention. For the Chief of Defence Staff to stand in public and make demands on Parliament is to suggest that the democracy he serves does not measure up to his personal standard.

Not everyone shares Hillier's opinion.

Some Canadians are not happy at all with the motion before Parliament and wish to see Canada's role in Afghanistan ended as soon as possible. They view, with some substantial support, the Afghanistan mission as a fiasco brought about by an inattentive and incompetent US presidential administration which has done more to exacerbate the problem in Afghanistan than they have to solve it. In short, they think it's a Bush administration problem in which our presence is aiding and abetting the ability of that administration to pursue other misguided and illegal adventures.

Others believe there should be no debate at all; that the government has the legal right to proceed without consulting Parliament and commit forces as they see fit. They might even have a valid conventional argument, even if it does demonstrate a turpitude which most would find unacceptable.

Still others believe that the question should be exhaustively debated. That Parliament examine this mission as closely as possible and consider the consequences of any decision taken. They do not want a quick decision; they want a considered decision.

Hillier's statement belies the fact that, until he has a new set of orders from the Canadian government, his subordinate general at Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command has a mission in Afghanistan that will expire in 2009. It is the government, not Parliament which has the authority to continue the mission. It is the government which has caused the delay in coming to a decision. It was an extended parliamentary break, ordered by the government and done purely for political reasons, which delayed addressing the question. It was the government which chose to engage in a political charade which produced a pre-ordained report.

Hillier, in choosing to suggest that Parliament is culpable in placing a haze over the Afghanistan mission, neatly avoided one particular issue. Even if Parliament carries the current government motion placed before it and the debate ends, there is still no decision.

Harper has stated that Canada will withdraw unless it receives a 1000 troop reinforcement from NATO and additional equipment is forthcoming. If the debate was settled tomorrow those caveats remain. Further, and Hillier knows this, those reinforcements need to come from a single country and have the same length of commitment as Canada in order to be effective. A cobbled together force from several countries will cause a gathering of national command elements which would reduce the actual number of available combat troops. The "1000" identified in the Manley report comes with no qualification: 1000 rifles is, as Hillier is aware, completely different from 1000 troops.

If any country does commit, the duration of that commitment is critical. Anything short of December 2011 means that Canada will be faced with the same problem sometime in the future.

Aside from the plethora of other reasons to question whether success in Afghanistan is even possible, Hillier, in pointing at Parliament, also failed to point out another weakness: NATO itself. ISAF is comprised of a fragmented array of forces with a range of instructions issued by their national governments. The nature of regional assignments by nation inside Afghanistan is the greatest military weakness, but it also reflects how much emphasis those nations put on the Afghanistan situation. Since their commitment seems to suggest they will maintain a presence down to the last Canadian soldier means it is up to us to critically examine the mission.

While Hillier makes noises about Parliament he conveniently did not mention that there are indications that the Canadian Forces are making new plans. Several separate intimations suggest that the CF is planning for an increase in Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT). About 150 Canadian Forces members are currently training the Afghan 1st Brigade, 205 Corps consisting of three small infantry battalions (kandaks). There are strong indications that Ottawa intends to increase this to two or possibly three OMLTs. So far, no one has said whether this is a change in focus or an increase in the number of people who will deploy in the future.

So, General Hillier can blame Parliament all he wants. Whether he likes it or not, that body answers to the Canadian public and we have the right to expect that questions before it will be debated properly and completely. As for the delays he seems to feel he has to whine about, he should more clearly define his target. The delays exist because the Harper government has been fumbling about trying to find itself. The delays exist because the Canadian public sees little more than a cloak of darkness cast over a costly mission and demands to know what the hell is going on.

That means the nature of the mission will be debated and defined by the elected representatives of the population and they should take whatever amount of time necessary to arrive at a reasonable compromise. General Hillier needs to be reminded that he serves the democracy; not the other way around.

More at POGGE, liberal catnip and Impolitical

The more things change, the more they remain the same

Back in the day there was no such thing as a military ombudsman. We had to state a complaint, "at the table", as a Captain's Requestman. (The procedure for the Royal Navy and Canadian Navy are identical).

When the military ombudsman became a fact of life there were two things we all hoped:

1. That the pressure of complaints and the means to provide redress would be somewhat relieved; and,

2. That some of the ongoing irritants which so regularly and consistently pissed-off sailors, soldiers and air-force personnel would be addressed.

It would appear, however, that such is not the case. In fact, given that we now have fairly regular casualties occurring in Afghanistan, "things" may have gotten worse.

The outgoing military ombudsman is criticizing Ottawa for failing to provide adequate support to families of fallen and injured soldiers, especially those with post-traumatic stress disorder.

In an exclusive interview with CBC News, Yves Côté said his office has dealt with many families who complain of too few answers after a death in Afghanistan or little help after loved ones return home with mental health problems.

Here's the point: PTSD is still treated as something embarrassing by the Canadian Forces and there is still a stigma attached to those who visit the "shrink".

The ombudsman was supposed to have provided a fast-track in the resolution of problems. From all accounts, that has occurred, but there are great gaping holes, one of them being the difficulties encountered by families and the ability of families to speak directly to the CF bureaucracy in the absence of the military member.

The article continues with something even more revealing than most people think. Do you know how difficult it is to get a special forces member to speak about anything?

A former member of Canada's elite special operations force told CBC News that while he was serving in Afghanistan, his wife haggled with the military in a dispute over $30,000 in moving expenses.

Brian, who did not want to give his last name, said he returned from his mission and witnessed the toll it took on his wife.

"She had lost a bunch of weight; her skin was grey. She looked sick," he said. "I was making my wife sick because of my job and their lack of support."

He quit the military last July, citing family stress.

"It was the greatest job I've ever had," he said. "It was fantastic, but I love my wife more, and I'm not going to let them treat her like that."

Cote gave it a good shot, but he was fighting a system that provides a lot of lip service to problems involving families. The bureaucracy would rather not hear from families or spouses at all, much less acknowledge their existence.

Côté said Ottawa should make sure families are not ignored or lost in the system, as they are "paying a huge price as a result of their dear ones having served Canada in Afghanistan."

He said he is presenting recommendations on how to address such issues in two reports his office is preparing, to be released this spring.

No one from the department of national defence was available for comment.

Taken in order, Cote is absolutely correct, the two reports will find themselves a place on the famous "shelf of dust" and, I'm not surprized.

Supporting the troops has nothing to do with being a cheer leader for a dubious mission.

H/T CC.

Is Jay Hill dishonest, or can he just not read?

Big City Lib picked up government whip Jay Hill's column from The Voice of The North in which Hill expounds on the great things that will happen now that Canada has C-17 Globemaster aircraft. By way of example Hill refers to the 2004 South Asia Tsunami and the fact that Canada's Disaster Assistance Response Team couldn't be sent immediately into the disaster area.

Nations around the world rushed to send personnel, equipment and medical supplies. Canada’s own Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) didn’t arrive on the scene until nearly two weeks later. Why did a supposed “quick response” unit, established to deliver humanitarian assistance and clean water in domestic and international disasters, take so long to arrive? Well, DART had no means to get there.

Indeed, is it any wonder that the 2004 Tsunami was the first time the Canadian Forces DART unit had been deployed since 1999? You see, Canada had no aircraft to carry DART to its mission. The former Liberal government of the time, which had steadfastly refused to adequately equip the Canadian Forces, had to scramble to secure transportation for the unit. In the end, they rented an aircraft from Russia for a whopping price tag of $4.4-million U.S.

Big City Lib refers back to the time of the disaster with a quote from Tony Gilles of Lakehead University which clears up the fact that, even then, DART was not a quick response unit. BCL, at the end of his post, expresses some regret that the original link to Gilles is no longer accessible.

Actually, I don't view that as a problem. BCLSB has an original accurate quote from an authority and that should suffice. Except that it's unlikely Jay Hill will seek out a liberal blog as an authority should he be challenged on his fallacious assertion.

So... we're here to help.

Jay Hill should check out the actual DART site before making public statements that DART is a "quick response" unit.

DART is no such thing. In fact, Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters, which coordinates DART, makes it very clear that the team is deployed after the rapid emergency response units. (Emphasis mine)

Operational Criteria

In order to have optimal impact in the prevention of loss of life and suffering, the DART addresses the secondary impacts of a disaster. The secondary impacts include casualties resulting from injuries sustained during the disaster and from the spread of sickness and disease such as dysentery and typhoid that can occur when large populations are displaced and living in crowded conditions without adequate sanitation and drinking water. Accordingly, the DART's primarily capabilities are provision of primary medical care and purified water.

Following a disaster, it is apparent that there are three phases of disaster response; they may be termed: the Immediate Life Saving Phase, the Stabilization Phase, and the General Recovery Phase. The DART is not meant to be active in the search and rescue activities of the Immediate Life Saving Phase and therefore is not required to arrive at a disaster location within hours of the disaster occurring. The DART is also not intended to remain active during the longer-term General Recovery Phase, they are to remain in theatre approximately 40 days at which time organizations focused on the redevelopment phase would arrive to take over. Recovery is ideally left to local authorities and international humanitarian organizations (possibly supported by the private sector) that specialize in this complex effort and havea long-term commitment. Therefore the DART focuses on relief activities of the Stabilization Phase; however, this concept in no way precludes the CF from contributing other forces during any of the three phases.

Something else Mr. Hill should learn. Units of the Canadian Forces mounted to perform relief tasks are labeled as to their precise capability. If DART was a "rapid response" unit, the word "rapid" or "quick" would have been included in the original title. It isn't and it never was.

Since Hill apparently doesn't have a grasp of the facts with respect to airlift, I doubt very much that he understands what really makes DART less than an instantaneous response organization.

Hill probably joins a good number of people who think that DART, and its roughly 210 personnel, are sitting about CFB Kingston twiddling their thumbs, occasionally playing with their water makers, waiting for the world's next big disaster.

He'd be wrong, just as he was in describing DART as a "quick response" unit.

DART, aside from a few technicians and planners, is virtually unmanned. The equipment is stowed away. The people required to man DART come from other units. They are designated for DART when it's activated. The rest of the time they're in regular units, many scattered across the country. And I can tell you from personal experience that when a unit like this is suddenly activated it is nothing short of a mad scramble to try and get the required people to make it work.

DART Composition

The DART is comprised of about 210 highly trained personnel designated from several units in the CF

Jay Hill apparently doesn't know that.

Unless Hill's "not so new" government has altered the manning policy of the Canadian Forces to create a personnel establishment surfeit, the response time of the DART will not change. Given that the Harperites, in opposition, supported the reduction in manpower of the Canadian Forces in the 1990s, they bear as much responsibility as previous government for whatever speed of response exists in any CF unit today.

And, as for the cost of deploying the DART using leased aircraft (dual purpose An-124-100s), that is a mere fraction of what the C-17 Globemaster is costing the Canadian taxpayer. Even at $4.4 million per deployment, the DART could be sent anywhere in the world and retrieved 350 times for the same cost of the small fleet of C-17 Globemasters.

Hill has also, quite conveniently ignored the fact that NATO has established a multinational strategic airlift contract for NATO military purposes, using six An-124-100 (larger than a C-17), to be made available to Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

That means Canada will have excess strategic airlift capability since Canada's C-17s will sit idle for about 80 percent of their operational lives.

But, we rushed out and bought the C-17. In a no bid contract.

Mythbusting. The Canadian Armed Forces are not a substitute for jail.

You have to wonder how violent this sexual assault was? What was established is that the offender, a member of the Canadian Forces, did not have the consent of his victim and did try to hide the incident. For that he gets 15 months community service, 18 months probation and a $1,500 fine.

A soldier based at Canadian Forces Base Valcartier outside Quebec City was sentenced Friday to 15 months of community service for sexually assaulting a young woman.

April Reign quite properly questions the leniency of the sentence in this case. I will take on the other point.

Provincial court Judge Carol Saint-Cyr rejected the defence's request for an unconditional discharge, which would have allowed Pte. Pier-Olivier Boulet, 22, to serve a tour in Afghanistan.

Oh yeah! That old chestnut! If jail can be avoided my client will dee-dee on down to the recruiting office and join the army right now. Or, in this case, My client is due to be shipped overseas to a combat zone. He's needed by his country and six months in action will clear up this whole thing and return a better citizen. What say you m'lord?

Not. Fucking. Likely.

Thankfully the judge wasn't buying any of it. When is the myth of "military service or jail" going to die? It is neither a valid defence nor a means of mitigating a sentence. The armed forces is not an alternative to prison/jail/punishment for convicted criminals. In Canada it never really has been, but certainly in the last 40 years most recruiters would turn away anybody with a criminal record, particularly where the offence involved any form of assault. Short assessment: Individuals with that kind of character flaw do not make good soldiers/sailors/airmen.

Then this:

The Department of National Defence will have the final word on whether Boulet is allowed to stay in the Canadian Forces.

Canadian Forces human resources officer Michel Arsenault had told Canadian Press that Boulet was a good soldier in his two years of service, but has a 95 per cent chance of losing his job in the military if he emerged from the trial with a criminal record.

Hold it.

Boulet was convicted in February. There has been plenty of time to appeal the verdict. Whether there was the possibility of a discharge or not, the conviction alone is enough in the Canadian Forces to release an individual under Queen's Regulations and Orders 15.01 item 5(F).

The chance of Boulet having his membership in the Canadian Forces unceremoniously terminated should be closer to 100 percent. In fact, it should have happened already.

So much excitement. So little toilet paper.

It seems some of the more virulent blogistan war-bangers are getting all short of breath over this article, with at least one of the Blogging Tories claiming that it's "nice to see Canada doing some of the heavy lifting for a change."

Jesusfuckingchrist!!! It's all heavy lifting. It's always been heavy lifting! What the hell was putting a battalion group on the front line during Operation Mountain Thrust? An infantry association cookout? But it's not heavy lifting until there are main battle tanks in the picture? Is that it? There has to be big things that make a big bang?

Canuck tanks roll
Leopards playing key role in Operation Achilles

That's the headline and, if that's all you read, well...

I don't see how this produces evidence that Canadian Forces in Afghanistan weren't doing the "heavy lifting" prior to the execution of Operation Achilles. During Operation Mountain Thrust, Canada employed a significantly larger force and the tactical commander of the entire operation, was a Canadian brigadier general.

There is also the fact that Canada has incurred a disproportionately high number of combat casualties when compared to other allies. If that's not an indication of "heavy lifting", what is? Is the casualty count not high enough?

Further down the Edmonton Sun article, however, there is information which seems to have been ignored. (Emphasis mine)

A force of more than 200 soldiers from the Royal Canadian Regiment battle group is supporting the offensive by setting up a blocking position in the Maywand district just inside the northwestern border of Kandahar province.

The key words are "blocking position". And then there's this:

The Gagetown, N.B.-based soldiers are tasked with preventing Taliban militants from retreating through the region, said Brig.-Gen. Tim Grant, the senior Canadian commander.

They are also to disrupt bands of local insurgents, including drug lords who control the opium trade.

Grant said he doesn't expect the same type of bloody pitched battles between Canadians and Taliban fighters that occurred last year in the Panjwaii and Zhari districts west of Kandahar city.

"I don't expect to see and I hope not to see any fighting by Canadians in the Maywand district," said Grant, who noted the battle group includes a force of 46-tonne Leopard 2 tanks.

"If things go well then we won't have to fire a shot in anger. If the Taliban choose to stand and take us on, then they will learn how robust the Canadian force is."

Right. Because what Grant is describing is what is known as a mobile defence, something which is usually carried off by the tactical reserve on the battlefield. He describes it in a little more detail here:

"We will provide a very robust force that will essentially sit on top of the Taliban lines of communication, in an area of western Kandahar province that has traditionally been a thoroughfare for the Taliban," Brig.-Gen. Grant said. "They have moved their troops and their casualties and their logistics supplies through this area, sometimes at will. So we are going in there to disrupt them, which will allow the other coalition forces in Helmand province to prosecute their operation more freely."

Again, it is a description of a tactical reserve and a mobile defence. I would have expected the war-bloggers to have known that. It's very curious.

I don't want to minimize the danger, because it doesn't matter where a force appears in the battle-space, it is always dangerous. And even a mobile defence can get ugly if the opposition correctly predicts the ambush points, but the insinuation that the presence of Canadian tanks is an elevation of force committed to the front of the operation is completely erroneous.

The Leopards are a force multiplier for the Canadian unit which is operating in reserve. They are not being committed with other NATO forward units.

It's a team effort. Everyone is doing the heavy lifting.

Hillier's dilemma

General Rick Hillier managed to anger more than a few people with his "Decade of Darkness" speech. Indeed, he was wrong to truncate the truth. It was more like a quarter century of darkness and, if he was going to speak out that way, he should have painted the whole picture.

The government which preceded the "Decade of Darkness", that of Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives, perpetrated as much as what followed in the Chretien years. Prior to that, Pierre Trudeau had to be pounded into understanding that if he allowed any further rust-out of the armed forces that even minor peacekeeping missions would be difficult to manage and support.

The Mulroney Conservatives inherited major equipment modernization and upgrades from the Trudeau Liberals. Beyond that, eight years of mismanagement and a forces-wide pay freeze were the hallmark events of that government.

Hillier's heinous crime, if he felt so compelled to lay blame for the condition of the armed forces, was to limit it to just the Chretien era. Beyond that, and this is what galls most people, he failed to acknowledge that the Paul Martin Liberals had restored funding to the Canadian Forces and had promised significant growth with a view to re-equipping and modernizing the CF over the next five years. The Harper Conservatives inherited that program - not the one that preceded it. Hillier was being less than honest by not pointing that out.

Notwithstanding all of that, Hillier is not a Harper appointee. He was selected and appointed by Paul Martin. And, no matter how you view it, Hillier has always been outspoken. Martin was well aware that Hillier would fight tooth and nail to get what he needed for an effective armed forces. In his first speech as Chief of Defence Staff he spoke directly to Martin and his government.

In this country, we could probably not give enough resources to the men and women to do all the things that we ask them to do. But we can give them too little, and that is what we are now doing. Remember them in your budgets.

If Paul Martin was surprised by that statement, he didn't show it. In fact, this was the guy Paul Martin wanted at the head of the Canadian Forces. A general who wasn't afraid to defend his own troops and, more than just an advocate, someone who would fight to mold the Canadian Forces into a modern, multi-role, expeditionary combat capable service.

Hillier probably would have been happy with a Paul Martin Liberal government.

Last week's "Decade of Darkness" speech certainly appeared to be over the line. But then, Hillier has never been known for selecting his words well. (Outwardly calling the Taliban, the enemy his forces would be required to face, "murderers and scumbags" was unprofessional at the least and dangerously stupid at most. It demonstrated a clear lack of respect for an enemy he had not properly assessed. Failure to respect the enemy is a soldier's folly.) In that, it may be that Hillier has been badly misinterpreted. While everyone viewed that speech as a jab at the previous Liberal regime (and a certain amount of that can never be denied), he could quite easily have been speaking directly to his current political masters. Something along the lines of "You have to do more for the CF if you want the CF to do more for you. You get what you give."

Hillier is in a fight with the man who is ostensibly his superior, Minister of National Defence, Gordon O'Connor.

So, how serious is the bad blood?

Well, sources say O'Connor has prohibited Hillier from talking to the Prime Minister's Office without his permission, something Liberals insist is a new way of doing business between supreme leaders.

By most accounts, there was a very acrimonious showdown last month when O'Connor rolled out a six-page attachment to the mandate letter that diverted soldiers to protect Arctic sovereignty and put them in position around a dozen cities as emergency responders.

It's a prohibitively costly exercise that will lay claim to thousands of already scarce troops who are needed on international fronts, particularly with the Taliban on the rise. The way some military brass see it, a domestic priority is admirable, but those soldiers just train for eventualities that may never come.

Still, O'Connor is adamant that his Canada First defence policy is critical and has infuriated the brass by demanding Hillier plan for the questionable deployment of a rapid-reaction battalion to Goose Bay, N.L., and the relocation of the Joint Task Force 2 to Trenton, Ont., which seems more to do with electioneering than legitimate military manoeuvres.

It all came to a head a few weeks ago when a top-level military meeting with Prime Minister Stephen Harper was scrubbed at the last minute because officials felt no consensus was possible.

Two things emerge. Hillier quite likely had a far better relationship with his Liberal defence minister, Bill Graham, than he has with O'Connor.

O'Connor, once Hillier's superior officer in the army, has laid out several plans with which Hillier disagrees and on which he has not been consulted. There have been several occasions where Hillier has butted heads with O'Connor, but the first was undoubtedly the question of strategic airlift. The Harperites, O'Connor included, have some kind of overwhelming urge to build a permanent and expensive strategic airlift component into the CF. Hillier wanted no part of that if it meant paying for it with a loss of tactical air mobility.

The current fight is over domestic operations and plans to make major changes to domestic defence structure and disbursal of resources, troops and capability. Hillier has made it clear that it cannot be done with what exists now, nor can it be done within the envelope of the forecast increases provided by the last Conservative budget.

It will take a lot more money and a lot more troops than what the Conservatives are offering. The CF is emerging, after all, from a decade of darkness, which the Conservative/Alliance/Reform opposition of the day acknowledged as a fiscal necessity, and the legacy of those fiscal restraints has caused considerable damage. Hillier is telling O'Connor and Harper what he needs to correct the problem and if they are not prepared to provide the massive additional funds and a significant increase in personnel then they had better stop asking for things Hillier is unable to provide.

The second thing which surfaces is that O'Connor is attempting to play general. O'Connor retired from the CF as a brigadier general. That is a notable achievement, but he never did attain the level he had hoped for. Hillier, once O'Connor's subordinate, did achieve the top job and while we'll never hear it, O'Connor is probably somewhat rankled over that. And then there's a little thing called Peter Principle. O'Connor advanced into the most junior of the general officer ranks and did not move beyond that for some reason. That is not to say his competence as a BGen was in question, but he was obviously not considered suitable for further promotion. By taking over the political defence file he is probably in over his head by being elevated to his own level of incompetence. He is supposed to be managing a department; Hillier runs the armed forces.

Something of the fight that is going on was made evident when the navy had to announce that they would not be able to carry out a scheduled sovereignty patrol. The Maritime Commander would have reported the navy's financial condition to Hillier. Understand that Hillier, as CDS would never want any part of the CF to have to stand-down for lack of money. But the navy held firm and at a point where O'Connor clearly did not provide the funds necessary to keep the navy at a proper operational tempo, Hillier let the flotilla commander release the information to the media. O'Connor was forced to acquiesce and come up with additional funding. The navy then followed up with the next announcement that would see them pull out of major international exercises. Hillier would have been fully aware of that. It was also a sign that at the department level, not the force level, funds were being manipulated and moved against the wishes of the Chief of Defence Staff.

So, while Hillier certainly spoke in such a way that it could be interpreted as a Conservative Party prop, I have certain doubts. Once the whole picture is in place, I see Hillier talking to his current political boss.

And it's not a pleasant conversation.

The Conservative Sponsorship Program: The C-17 Globemaster

(Click on photo to enlarge)
The announcement by O'Connor, (former defence procurement lobbyist) and Fortier (who remains unelected) that Boeing has been awarded a multi-billion dollar contract to provide C-17 III Globemaster heavy-lift aircraft is hardly a surprize. That the pair have just piled ahead, against some significant opposition would be worth a medal if they were taking a hill. But they weren't. They were blowing money to make themselves and Harper feel good.

The Honourable Gordon O'Connor, Minister of National Defence, together with the Honourable Michael M. Fortier, Minister of Public Works, and the Honourable Maxime Bernier, Minister of Industry today announced The Boeing Company has been awarded the contract to supply strategic airlift aircraft to the Canadian Forces.

Even though the Chief of Defence Staff made it quite clear that strategic airlift was not a problem. Tactical airlift is lacking and our fleet of Hercules tactical lift aircraft have literally a few hours of life left in them, particularly the CC-130E model which is now exceeding 50,000 hours of service.

But hang on. There's more.

Last June Skylink Aviation Inc. offered the DND a $42 million annual contract to put four heavy lift, long range aircraft at the disposal of the Canadian Forces on a 24/7 basis, including basing them at CFB Trenton with 8 Wing. The aircraft being proposed would have given the CF an immediate capability with two of the aircraft being no less than the massive Antonov AN-124. There might have been a problem with the livery but I'm pretty sure Skylink, for an extra few thousand dollars, would have been happy to have thrown in a non-reflective grey paint job.

The Boeing C-17 Globemaster, according to the DND press release is coming in at $3.4 billion. That's going to shoot up quickly. The price of a C-17 to the US Air Force is $237 million per airplane, excluding spares and program costs. The truth is, the CF could have leased strategic lift aircraft, on a continuously ready basis, for 20 years and still not reach the advertised cost of four new C-17s.

Then there is the procurement method. Using an Advance Contract Award Notice, the Harper government literally shut-out all other possible bidders. Given that O'Connor probably has some pretty secure contacts at Boeing, that makes the whole deal a little smelly. Given that the CF was very much against this idea from the start, it gives O'Connor's headlong rush to get the C-17, and only the C-17, the look of something underhanded. He, after all, was the lobbyist and the whole process left the aircraft industry more than a little miffed and a little bewildered.

With respect to the competition, Canada's program used an "Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN)," which permits the Government to identify an intended contract award recipient (in this case, Boeing for the C-17) based on its specifications and detailed market research. Industry is then invited to submit proposals that qualify, and proposals were submitted that included at least one offer of leased C-17s. All submissions were promptly disqualified for one reason or another, and despite complaints from some of the bidders, the Canadian DND pressed on with the course of action it had obviously intended from the start.

Which invariably translates into a bad deal, monetarily, for the taxpayer.

Too much of this adds up to something rotten. The lack of contract bidding, the rush by O'Connor, the rejection of other alternatives and the cost suggest someone is getting something juicy out of this and it isn't the taxpayer.

The BS from the Harper-O'Connor bivouac

I had been meaning to do this post earlier but I was busy keeping my eyes open for terrorists and black-ice on the Coquihalla highway, then some irritating insurgent microbe got through my defences reducing me to one sniffling throw away post.

Anyway, this has caused a bit of hand wringing in some quarters, outrage in others and an unwarranted amount of cheering in still others. First, the headline:

Military wants more troops in cities

That's what happens when an editor assigns the headline to a report that actually says something completely different; an editor who isn't smart enough to make the distinction between organizational bodies. The military hasn't asked for this at all. This is a Harper/O'Connor campaign and comes out of the "Canada First" defence strategy of the Conservative government. It does not originate with the Canadian Armed Forces.

The Harper government plans to increase the Canadian Forces presence across the country with new units in 14 cities as well as shifting 5,000 regular force personnel from support and desk jobs to training and front-line missions.

This has led people to suggest that the Liberal attack ads of the last election campaign were, in fact, accurate. They were not. This "territorial" concept to the Canadian Forces, particularly at the reserve component level, is as old as the militia itself. It's not new and it's not innovative. This doesn't mean putting troops on the street at all. It means increasing the size of the army and navy reserves and, while that may translate in the minds of the CPoC to a greater military presence in major cities, it means more people training evenings and weekends. The numbers of uniforms visible on a daily basis would hardly change particularly since O'Connor is proposing to put these units in larger Canadian cities.

During the election campaign, the Conservatives promised their government would create territorial battalions. At the time, Stephen Harper said each unit would be composed of 100 regular troops and 400 or more reservists. The strategy paper, however, does not contain details on how big the units will actually be.

I'll bet the strategy paper doesn't contain details. I know why too. This concept has been tried before and was a spectacular failure.

In the early 1990s during a force reduction and base closure program some major army units were shifted to reserve status and designated 90/10 battalions or regiments. The concept was to man a unit with 10 percent regular force and 90 percent reserve force, giving those units a higher level of combat readiness and training than most reserve units which had a small regular support staff. The whole idea lasted about a year as the reality of recruiting and staffing took hold. The regular force had difficulty manning their portion and the volunteers for the reserve element simply weren't there, leaving the unit chronically understrength.

Between now and 2016, the army will establish "territorial response battalions" in Victoria, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg, Niagara-Windsor, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Saint John, Halifax and St. John's. The units would be designed to react to domestic emergencies such as natural disasters or a terrorist attack.

The concept of having the reserve force respond to natural disasters and terrorist attacks is commendable. They do the natural disaster response now. There have never been any terrorist attacks in Canada from which to gauge how they might respond to that, but it needs to be understood, the duty would be post-event response and probably along the lines of an organized crew providing emergency infrastructure services. The presence of a military does not prevent terrorist attacks, lest we have all forgotten that the bulk of the US military was at home the day those planes flew into the World Trade Center. But, there is another point here.

There are 184 naval, army and air force reserve units (excluding regimental bands) in 87 cities and towns across Canada. Many are in smaller cities giving, particularly the army, a true territorial footprint. In the cities mentioned in the strategy paper the military presence by numbers of naval divisions, army battalions and air reserve formations, not even considering the regular force units in those centres, is provided by the reserve component of the CF as follows:
Victoria: 6
Vancouver: 8 (includes North Vancouver)
Calgary: 6
Edmonton: 9
Regina: 4
Winnipeg: 8
Niagara-Windsor: 30 (depending on boundary)
Toronto: 12
Ottawa: 9
Montreal: 12 (includes Westmount)
Quebec City: 6
Saint John: 3
Halifax: 8
St. John's: 5

Now consider for a moment that these established CF reserve units suffer from a continuing lack of recruits. Most never achieve full effective strength. The Conservatives are proposing to add yet another battalion-strength unit of anywhere from 500 to 1000 people in each of those cities. Where are the people going to come from?

This "leak" has little or nothing to do with the Canadian Forces actual strength. This is an attempt to secure a military vote and offer a bone to the cities where the Conservatives are hoping to gather a few more votes by suggesting they are providing something. However, given the concentration of reserve units in those cities and regions now, you can bet that they will point at existing units, renamed or adjunctly identified (territorial battalion), and declare that they fulfilled their promise. In short, they're lying now and they're going to lie in the future.

As for the rest of the report, the idea of moving JTF2 to Trenton is stupid beyond belief. JTF2 is in Dyer Hill for a reason. I'm sure if O'Connor stopped to listen to people who are actually in the service instead of his own voice, he'd be able to figure it out.

The Marine Commando Regiment in Comox is interesting. If it's "marine" then it is sea deployable. Comox is the worst possible location for any such unit. A more rational location would be on southern Vancouver Island. This is yet another attempt at vote-buying.

The single most important factor to consider however, it that none of this is going to actually happen. It's a pipe-dream. The troops in the cities is more smoke and mirrors from Harper's PR machine. Those cheering the idea will be disappointed. Those questioning the plan can safely ignore it.

It's not a plan; it's an advertising campaign.