Perhaps the concept of the Joint Support Ship was
one task too many. It was, in one sense at least, something of a desperation move to satisfy many demands on a navy that urgently wanted one real thing - replacements for the old, steam-driven, fleet replenishment ships. That was number one on the design item list - the ability to keep a naval task group refuelled and resupplied at sea. Without them the sovereign global mobility of the Canadian Navy would become impossible.
The Defence Department has spent $44 million so far on office and support costs and consulting contracts for its program to purchase a new fleet of supply ships, but government officials are now examining whether to start afresh on the troubled project. [...] The program, known as the Joint Support Ship or JSS, was derailed in August after the bids from two consortiums were rejected by the government.
In fact, the Navy has already been staring at that cold boiler. The refits of HMC ships
Protecteur and
Preserver have seen those ships removed from service for over 18 months each, leaving either the Atlantic or Pacific task group without Canadian provided underway replenishment.
The Canadian Navy had never been in the business of transporting the Canadian Army in any significant numbers. (The exception is the 2nd World War when three Canadian Pacific passenger liners were taken into service, converted to armed-merchant cruisers and were employed as infantry landing ships). However, the
GTS Katie episode, wherein the American owner of the ship refused to deliver the load of armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition returning from the Kosovo mission until more money was paid, folded another role into the yet-to-be-designed replenishment ship replacement - that of military sealift.
Still another role was developing. The ships, aside from being able to keep frigates and destroyers replenished, and taking into account the roll-on-roll-off requirement would also be expected to perform a role in the littoral zones, acting as support and safe off-the-beach area for troops over the beach.
To anybody familiar with any one of those roles, the thought of kneading those three significantly different functions into one hull was not simply daunting; it was mind-boggling. Another thing was obvious: In order to get what everybody wanted, it was going to be expensive.
And everybody wanted everything. As much as the funds would come from the naval envelope, all three services wanted these ships for their own specific purposes.
The Joint Support Ship project was given the go-ahead by the Paul Martin Liberal government. The original plan called for four ships. Even those of us standing on grey plate never believed that would happen. Three was more likely the case, particularly since most of us were viewing the fleet replenishment role as primary and rationalization of that function meant three; not four. The current situation of two fleet replenishment ships had already highlighted the fact that the Navy was one ship shy of its needs.
Then something strange happened. The Harper government, in its effort to demonstrate a much stronger committment to national defence than anybody on the planet, took total ownership of the Navy's JSS project. They went to great lengths to ensure that it looked like
their idea. Anything related to defence procurement got a "Harper" label.
No one was complaining, save for the fact that had the project proceeded unimpeded, it
might have made it under the funding wire as a viable three ship procurment. Add a lengthy procurement review by the Harperites which stalled everything except the unplanned pet Conservative projects arising from election campaign promises and the Harper Accountability Act which has added a strong dose of cold molasses to the flow of information* in the public service and there was little chance that an increasingly expensive project would go forward anywhere near as planned.
The Navy is more than a little reluctant to accept a two ship option. That's what they're working with now in ships that are 40 years old and only performing one-third of what the JSS was supposed to do. That leaves scrapping the project altogether, writing off the money spent to date and respawning a new ship, (one far less capable, but perhaps more rational).
There is more. Much more.
In truth, the Canadian Navy is in tatters. The JSS project is effectively dead, the frigate mid-life extension project is in serious jeapordy and replacement shipborne helicopter delivery is now a date pulled from the air with no attachment to reality.
Worse though, is the manpower situation. The Navy is hemmorhaging skilled personnel.
That and more in future posts.
