Afghanistan is worse than a year ago - Red Cross.

Updated

The International Committee of the Red Cross has issued a report on the conditions in Afghanistan including an assessment of the humanitarian situation. To say it's not good would be a gross understatement.

The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is worse now than a year ago with "civilians suffering horribly", the International Committee of the Red Cross said today.

In a bleak assessment, the agency said the conflict had significantly intensified in the south and east of the country and was spreading to the north and west. The result had been a growing number of civilian casualties.

"Civilians suffer horribly from mounting threats to their security, such as increasing numbers of roadside bombs and suicide attacks, and regular aerial bombing raids," said Pierre Krähenbühl, the director of operations at the ICRC.

This, despite assurances from Harper's government that Canadian involvement in Afghanistan is making positive changes.

The updated assessment comes amid growing fears in the US and Britain that Nato forces have lost the initiative against the Taliban, which has gained momentum, particularly in the south.

Some 50,000 foreign troops led by the US and Nato are in Afghanistan, propping up the government of Hamid Karzai in Kabul, which is increasingly beset by allegations of corruption and incompetence.

The ICRC has no political axes to grind. The assessment it provides is based on its "on-the-ground" experience and observations. This interview with Reto Stocker, the ICRC's Head of Delegation in Kabul spells out one of the more serious problems.

The conflict has both intensified and spread to the north and west of Afghanistan since 2006. The humanitarian situation remains extremely tenuous. Civilians are highly vulnerable to an escalation of the conflict and recurrent natural disasters. It remains very difficult for humanitarian organizations to have safe access to victims, especially outside major cities. Indiscriminate methods of warfare, including attacks that, while aimed at military targets, can be expected to cause many civilian casualties, or which are otherwise carried out without taking the precautions needed to spare civilians, have also increased the risks faced by the common people.

That's not pointing a finger at either side. That's a statement that says both sides, the insurgent fighters and NATO/US forces are using methods which put unarmed civilians at great risk. Whether it is roadside bombs or less than precision air attacks, civilians not involved in the fighting are being killed. And, since NATO and the US are clearly unable to contain the fighting, zones of relative quiet outside the engaged areas of Helmand and Kandahar are becoming no less dangerous.

One of the benchmarks to determine progress against the insurgency and a demonstration of significant reconstruction is the repair of the Kajaki Dam. The dam and its turbines would provide hydroelectric power to approximately 2 million people. Combat operations this spring were intended to force the Taliban out of the Kajaki Valley. However, villages in the area have become more sympathetic to the Taliban in recent months, owing in no small part to the civilian casualties created NATO and US operations and the destruction caused by air strikes. While NATO may have forced the Taliban out, the commanders on the ground know they can't prevent them from coming back.

Using the Kajaki Dam as a meter for major reconstruction yields a telling result. Zero.

The area around the Kajaki Dam is not considered secure enough to allow workers to go in and install the turbine.

The Afghanistan mission was botched from the early days of the US led assault. Too much reliance on the Northern Alliance to capture Al-Qaida and Taliban forces led to an escape which perpetuated their existence. A rush by the Bush administration to create the appearance of a democracy and hand over security to NATO led to a new force taking over a country that was anything but secure and far less stable than NATO commanders had been led to believe. There was a hasty shift by the US to focus on the invasion of Iraq which compromised Afghanistan stability.

In short, NATO, including Canada, was sold a bill of goods in an international con job perpetrated by the same neo-con regime which lied its way into war with Iraq.

I recently had a conversation with an old friend from my service days. He's still in the Canadian army regular force and has extensive experience resulting from many peacekeeping missions and reconnaissance operations. We pulled a few missions together to some pretty nasty places over the past couple of decades. He's a captain; not a general. He has held every non-commissioned rank in the army including an appointment as a regimental sergeant major. His assessment of the conditions in Afghanistan is bleak. He told me that while he was there he initially felt he was doing some good. As his tour wore on, however, he came to the realization that Afghanistan was an incredible mess and the current efforts of both NATO and the US weren't going to change that. He summed it up neatly using a familiar line:

"Go in big, or just stay home."

Exactly. The force that NATO now provides was intended to take a relatively secure place and make sure it stayed that way. The existing security, however, was mythical and not consolidated. And, given the strength of current forces in Afghanistan, it never will be. As my friend said, "We can win this, but not the way we're doing it now. This is just spinning our wheels. We're not changing anything."

It's time the Harper government came clean with its employers. Admit that, under the current structure, the Afghan mission is doomed to failure. There has been no progress.

The government has an obligation to the troops to ensure they are on a mission they can complete successfully. There must be a tangible measure by which to determine the mission is complete. Platitudes don't count.

Clearly, to secure Afghanistan is going to take a much more serious effort. If NATO is to remain in place, the forces there need to be strengthened by a factor of 10. The government of Hamid Karzai is little more than a puppet regime rife with corruption. It should be removed from the process of making final decisions.

Afghanistan needs to be occupied properly and have the instruments of self-government slowly introduced. Those were the things that were not done in the past. Afghanistan was treated as a rush job, akin to slapping a single coat of paint on dry, untreated wood and hoping it will last for 20 years.

If that isn't being considered then NATO, including Canada, needs to review the entire mission and produce an assessment of the projected results of their force capacity. No rosy speeches about how we could do so much good. If we're not changing things now, five years into this, we've already met with failure.

I've always supported the Afghanistan mission with serious reservations. I continuously question the worth of our presence.

The Canadian mission to Afghanistan needs to change. Either find a way to do it properly and effectively or withdraw. And that decision needs to be made now - not two weeks from now. The evidence is already there.

In its present form, I cannot support the current mission and Canadian contribution to NATO in Afghanistan. Get it changed or get out - now.

Update: The Globe and Mail's Alan Freeman has detailed a report issued by the International Assessment Staff of the Privy Council Office. It was produced in November 2006 and, had it not been written before the ICRC report, it would echo the same findings.

What stands out, however, is that Harper and O'Connor were issuing statements which ran counter to the findings of the International Assessment Staff. The IAS found that Afghanistan, particularly in the south and west, was becoming increasingly difficult to deal with, that reconstruction was not proceeding, that the rule of law was not being enforced, that warlords, drug-lords and politicians seemed to be immune from the law enforcement process and that pervasive opium cultivation was linked to the increasing insurgency.

It is telling that the report was dated 9 November, 2006. It would have been delivered immediately. The question is why Harper and O'Connor delivered speeches and op-ed columns after the delivery of the report which suggested that the situation in Afghanistan was different than the truth which had been delivered to them?

There is no question that O'Connor either has no clue as to what is actually transpiring in any of his ministry's files or he is a bald-faced liar. Either way, O'Connor should be summarily dismissed.

I won't give Harper the benefit of any doubt here. He is dishonest and he lies.

Another reason to withdraw from Afghanistan revolves around the political situation in Ottawa. We have never gotten the truth out of Harper with respect to the Afghanistan mission. The failure of the government to be forthright and honest with the Canadian population as to the actual state of country where our people are being killed and maimed is sufficient reason to demand a withdrawal.

Unless Harper and his ministers can produce honest evaluations of the state of the mission they should not be permitted to endanger Canadian troops.

In short, they knew. And then they lied about it.


Hat tip reader Cat for the Guardian link.

Hat tip Dana for the G&M link.

Wrong document. O'Connor is still on the hook for his ICRC claim

Stephen Taylor is trying desperately to get Gordon O'Connor off the hook for his mis-step on the detention and transfer of prisoners captured by Canadian troops using this document. (Caution. Large PDF file)

While I understand the confusion Taylor is experiencing and his desire to interpret portions of the Joint Doctrine Manual Prisoner of War Handling Detainees And Interrogation & Tactical Questioning in International Operations in O'Connor's favour, he's got it wrong.

Taylor quotes one section of the document claiming it is the erroneous information to which O'Connor was referring when he assured Parliament that the International Committee of the Red Cross would report to Canada if prisoners transfered to Afghanistan authorities were being mistreated.

Even after PW captured by Canada have been transferred to the custody of another nation, there is still a residual responsibility placed on Canada regarding their treatment. If the Government of Canada is notified by the Protecting Power, usually the ICRC, that the Detaining Power to whom the PW have been transferred is not complying with the provisions of the GCs, Canada has a duty to correct the problem, or to take the PW back into Canadian custody.

Taylor is trying to suggest that the statement "usually the ICRC" is sufficient policy direction to convince the minister that the ICRC held a position which would see them report to Canada if prisoners transfered to Afghanistan were mistreated.

First, the document is a part of CF doctrine. It is not specific to Afghanistan.

Secondly, because the document is doctrine, it requires clarification for a specific mission. In this case, the ICRC is identified as "usually" providing services for the Protecting Power. In order for them to actually do that, they have to be delegated the job by a Protecting Power and the ICRC reports back to the Protecting Power. In the case of Afghanistan, the ICRC has not been appointed a delegate of a Protecting Power.

Therefore, O'Connor who, as a former brigadier-general, is very well aware of the difference between policy documents, doctrine and operational orders should have known full-well that in order for the ICRC to have direct involvement with Canada over transfered prisoners, there would have to be clearly laid-out authority issued to the ICRC to represent a Protecting Power.

The same document in article 105, paragraph 2 explains the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross with regards to prisoners:

2. The ICRC is a neutral and private organisation based in Switzerland. Its work is conducted in conjunction with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, governments and voluntary organisations. The ICRC has a number of roles stemming from its principal responsibility for monitoring the application of the GCs and APs by signatory states. These can be summarised as follows: a. Aid to Prisoners of War. The ICRC helps wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces and PW. It attempts to improve their conditions of captivity over the whole period from their capture to their release. It carries out this work through its own delegates and in conjunction with the agency of the Protecting Power. b. Aid to Civil Populations. The ICRC acts on behalf of civil populations, whether they are in friendly territory, enemy territory or in occupied areas, and acts as a neutral intermediary to relieve unnecessary suffering. c. The Central Tracing Agency. The Central Tracing Agency of the ICRC collects all the information it may obtain (through official or private channels) regarding PW, civilians (especially internees) in the power of a Party to the conflict and missing persons. The Agency then transmits such information to the state of origin of the relevant persons.

Then there is article 106, paragraph 2 which provides the definition of a Protecting Power.

2. Definition. The Protecting Power is a non-belligerent State, which has been designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted by the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to a Protecting Power. A “substitute” is an organisation acting in place of a Protecting Power when agreement of Protecting Power nominations between Parties to the conflict cannot be reached.

A "substitute" is a delegated organization and must still be agreed upon by parties to the conflict. Article 106 further states:

3. Discharge of Responsibilities. As alluded to above, whilst there is an obligation upon Parties to the conflict to designate a Protecting Power, there is no guarantee that nominations will be acceptable to the adverse Party. Should there be no agreement after the subsequent intercession of the ICRC to mediate, then an offer by the ICRC or any other impartial humanitarian organisation to act as a ‘substitute’ Protecting Power, as defined in the previous paragraph, should be accepted. The Protecting Power will exercise its function through: a. Representatives. The normal diplomatic and consular personnel of the Protecting Power. b. Delegates. Persons appointed by the Protecting Power to discharge its functions under the GCs. Delegates will normally be nationals of the Protecting Power or of another neutral state. Members of the ICRC may also be appointed as delegates by the Protecting Power. It will normally be the Delegates who ensure, through physical checking, that PW are being treated in accordance with the GCs and AP I.

In the case of Afghanistan, the ICRC is not a "substitute" Protecting Power and the ICRC has made that clear.

To rely on the guidance in this document as definitive operational direction is folly. It provides a framework with the typical amount of "usual" and "ordinarily", but it is not a directive. In order to clarify the role of a Protecting Power another, more specific, document is required. One which would refer back to this one. That must exist since the ICRC is not acting as a "substitute". The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission is the authority monitoring prisoner treatment and O'Connor should have been aware of that right from the start.

Sorry, Stephen Taylor, your argument carries no weight.

The document in question is not false since it provides no definitive delegation of Protecting Power. It merely suggest which group might be, and in the case of the Afghanistan mission another organization has been given the task. A home-grown Afghani group with whom Canada has no extensive experience.

That O'Connor did not know this with authority indicates incompetence.

He's still on the hook for this one.

(Thanks to CC for the tip)

Not good enough!

Canadian Minister of National Defence, Gordon O'Connor apologized to the House of Commons today for his statements regarding Afghan detainees capture by Canadian Forces and turned over to the Afghan government.

He had stated that the International Committee of the Red Cross monitored the treatment of those prisoners and would report any abuse or ill-treatment directly to the Canadian government. That statement conflicted with the mandate of the ICRC which, over the course of almost 140 years of existence, and particularly since 1949, has maintained a completely neutral approach to prisoner treatment and which maintains a dialog with the detaining country.

O'Connor's apology has to be taken at face value and we should accept his word that he did not intentionally mislead the House nor the Canadian people.

Defence Minister Gordon O’Connor apologized on Monday to the House of Commons for getting his facts wrong on who monitors detainees in Afghanistan.

He acknowledged that he provided “inaccurate” information when he told the House a few weeks ago that the Red Cross monitors detainees and reports back to Canada.

[...]

During his apology Monday, O’Connor said he made the mistake honestly.

“I regret any confusion that may have resulted from these statements. The answers I gave were provided in good faith. I take full responsibility and do so without hesitation,” O’Connor said.

Really?! And then... (Emphasis mine)

“Mr. Speaker I would like to be clear: the International Committee of the Red Cross is under no obligation to share information with Canada on the treatment of detainees transferred by Canada to Afghan authorities. The International Committee of the Red Cross provides this information to the country that has the detainees in its custody, in this case, Afghanistan.”

Let me be clear. They won't share information with Canada.

The ICRC is in a precarious position when dealing with belligerents. The only way they can be effective is to strictly observe the methods they have been employing for decades, and that is to persuade the detaining power to ensure the proper treatment of prisoners by way of mutual cooperation. This is from the ICRC's own policy paper: (Emphasis original)

First, what they do NOT seek to achieve: the liberation of prisoners (other than particular individual cases, on strict medical or other humanitarian grounds). The standard ICRC procedures, which are made clear with the detaining authorities prior to the visits, include registration of the prisoners; an overview of all facilities used by, or intended for, them; a private talk with any or all of them, to discuss any problems they might have over their treatment or conditions; the provision of standard forms for writing a brief message to their families (which after approval by the detaining authorities will be delivered by the ICRC, insofar as this is possible). If the prisoners agree, their problems are taken up with the authorities immediately, with the aim of trying to solve them. The reports written by the ICRC after each visit are given to the detaining authorities and are not intended for publication - the point being that detention problems are best solved through constructive dialogue based on mutual confidence, rather than in the glare of publicity which inevitably carries the risk of politicizing the issues. This is why the ICRC will not comment publicly on such issues as possible problems concerning the transportation of prisoners or their conditions of detention.

That piece of information has been in existence for a considerable length of time. In fact, that information was a part of the Canadian Forces "Officer Professional Development Program" in the 1980s, a mandatory series of examinations based on self-study, one of the topics being "Military Law" with a strong emphasis on the Rules of Armed Conflict, Treatment of Prisoners of War and the involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

O'Connor would have been required to complete the OPD program while still serving in the army. Which means he should have been aware of the ICRC limitations on reporting the treatment of detainees.

Beyond that, however, is the fact that O'Connor has a relatively large staff which should be researching this material. How is it that he can step into the House of Commons and utter statements which are so far from accurate that they demonstrate a complete lack of understanding of the details of prisoner and detainee monitoring?

With full knowledge of the principle of "shit rolls downhill", I'm fairly confident that someone in DND, very near the minister's office wore the can for this, but that's not the point.

It took two minutes for me to look up and republish the information above from the ICRC's website. Two minutes. And I don't work for Mr. O'Connor.

Accepting that O'Connor did not intentionally mislead us, that leaves only one other conclusion. O'Connor did not do, or did not demand that his staff carry out, due diligence in answering a question of policy regarding the detention and treatment of prisoners handed over to the Afghan government.

O'Connor is incompetent.

His next act should be to go to his office, take out a pen and paper and write his resignation from cabinet. He is not fit to hold responsible office.

It's time for a new Defence Minister

liberal catnip has been all over this for some time now. And now, the International Committee of the Red Cross has confirmed that Canadian Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor does not have his facts straight.

The International Committee of the Red Cross confirmed Wednesday that it has no role in monitoring the Canada-Afghanistan detainee-transfer agreement, in direct contradiction to assurances Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor has made to the House of Commons.

The Red Cross also said that it would never divulge to Ottawa any abuses it might identify in Afghan prisons.

"We were informed of the agreement, but we are not a party to it and we are not monitoring the implementation of it," Simon Schorno, a spokesman for the ICRC, said in an interview.

In his most explicit statement to the House of Commons on May 31, Mr. O'Connor said: "The Red Cross or the Red Crescent is responsible to supervise their treatment once the prisoners are in the hands of the Afghan authorities. If there is something wrong with their treatment, the Red Cross or Red Crescent would inform us and we would take action."

That's not the truth.

It now puts into question the entire process of dealing with prisoners captured by Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. The truth is, the ICRC monitors the treatment of prisoners under international guidelines. If they detect prisoner abuse they issue a report, usually in a confidential manner, to all parties involved. The ICRC would be violating the mandate set out for them if they were to enter into any specific agreement with any belligerent involved.

O'Connor's suggestion that the ICRC supervises the treatment of prisoners is patently false. The ICRC monitors conditions under which prisoners are held and issues public reports while confidentially reminding the belligerent parties of their obligations under Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

O'Connor is a retired brigadier-general. He knows all this. Or, at least he should.

This has been the ICRC mandate in this regard for as far back as I can remember:

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is mandated by the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions to monitor the full application of and respect for the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. The ICRC reminds the High Contracting Parties concerned, usually in a confidential way, of their humanitarian obligations under all four Geneva Conventions, in particular the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions as far as treatment of persons deprived of their liberty is concerned and under Protocol 1 of 1977 additional to the Geneva Conventions, confirmed and reaffirmed rules of customary law and universally acknowledged principles of humanity.

Whether O'Connor is demonstrating a lack of knowledge of the ICRC position, or whether he is deliberately misleading Canadians is of little concern at this point. It is enough to demand his resignation as Minister of National Defence.