Your government doesn't like it when you know things

So much for anything resembling freedom, freedom of information or freedom of the press. The Harperites don't like it when you know stuff.

The Harper government called in the RCMP to investigate a politically embarrassing story involving the decision to sole-source the purchase of the F-35 stealth fighter, claiming it was a breach of national security, The Canadian Press has learned.

The Mounties conducted a five-month review into an alleged leak of cabinet documents under the Security of Information Act, recently used to charge a naval intelligence officer in an apparent spy case.

Records obtained under the Access to Information Act show investigators had doubts almost from the outset in July 2010 that any laws were broken in the Globe and Mail story.

The story revealed angst within government about possible alienation from Washington if a competition was held to replace the air force's CF-18s.

Still, the review pressed ahead and drew in one of the RCMP's four Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams, whose job it is to chase terrorism threats.

It was shut down in December 2010 for lack of evidence.

Oh yes, it gets better.

The case file shows the complaint was laid by Wayne Wouters, clerk of the Privy Council, the country's highest-ranking civil servant and adviser to Prime Minister Stephen Harper, shortly after the article appeared on June 11, 2010.

On orders from His Grace, you can bet. When a Harper hack moves on something like this it's because Harper issued a command.

So, to conclude ...

The RCMP closed its file in November 2010, but was forced to "re-activate" the case and "investigate further" because it was noted no one had talked to Wouters.

The file "should not have been concluded at this time before the complainant was met and had a chance to explain why he thinks there was a leak of 'secret cabinet documents,"' said a Dec. 22, 2010, notation.
The investigator apparently tried to contact Wouters, seeking clarification and was rebuked by the National Security Criminal Operations Branch, which noted the complaint had been filed by letter through the commissioner's office.

It took Mounties in charge of the case two-and-a-half months to get their hands on an actual copy of the letter, which had been "kept at the commissioner's office."

Any questions about who and what we're dealing with here?

Before you head out shopping today ...

Pig-in-a-Poke

And, if you're thinking of doing some seasonal shopping, in most places across the country you'll want to do it today and not leave it until tomorrow. The weather, in many places, is going to deteriorate, later in the day.

The west coast can expect a 995 millibar Low to move into Vancouver Island (and eventually the mainland) by mid-afternoon bringing heavy rain to the entire coast. The Fraser Valley will experience a severe drenching by Sunday.
Alberta will be clear, although temperatures are going to drop rapidly by Sunday. Same goes for southern Saskatchewan, although, according to the crystal ball, there will be blowing snow on Sunday and wind-chills in the -30+ range. (That's "stay-in-bed" weather).
Winnipeg will experience a normal day with wind-chill in the -30+ range, a bit of snow and then experience a sudden temperature drop by Sunday.
London, Ontario will have a clear day which will then turn messy on Sunday. As the temperature drops the east winds kick in, more snow is in your future.
Southern Quebec may have a problem. Today will be relatively clear, but as the winds rise and the temperature drops there is a very good chance of a minor ice-storm in around the Montreal area by Sunday.
The Maritimes will have some flurries or mixed rain and snow today. Overnight, however, the temperature will drop, winds will rise and everything will get icy.
St. John's Newfoundland will be positively balmy today. The daytime high will be -3 but it will be sunny and calm. By Sunday, expect the winds to rise, but then the temperature will too.

So, pretty much a normal winter weekend across the country with today being the better of the two days. Go shopping today and then button up tomorrow.

When you come back from your day at the bazaars, sit back and do a little reading. I know! Go take a look at Impolitical and then Far and Wide. That will warm you up. They will send you off to read David Pugliese which will cause your body temperature to rise even more.

You will then realize that all that comparison shopping you did, that concern for the effect of Christmas on your credit cards, the attempt to get just the right item for the very best price is how every purchase should be made, including those made by the Harper government.

Oh yes, for those special people who actually check out consumer reviews on big-ticket items before making a purchase, good on you. That's the way to make a proper assessment of expensive items. It means the item has to be on the market and available. Of course, you'll also be checking out the "return policy" of any place you shop.

Strangely, the Department of National Defence had pretty much the same policy when it came to buying military aircraft: Buy no aircraft which is not in operational use by an allied air force.

And then Harper hillbillies came to power. They look at the glossy brochure, check out the colours on the box and then blow the limit on your national credit card. They don't believe in smart shopping when it's them spending your money.


Cautionary note: Readers are advised not to make decisions based on the weather forecasting above. Despite the use of very accurate models from various sources, you should always refer to the official forecast issued by Environment Canada for your area. 

And for those who thought the weather was the most interesting part of this post ... check out Moderate Man. 

Harper is buying a bomb truck for the Canadian air force...

Not an air superiority fighter and not an interceptor. As MoS points out, the marrying of tactical nukes with the developing F-35 Lightning II, which the Harperites are all orgasmic about, is one of the roles initially intended for the F-35. As his post mentions, it's quite a package.

In terms of Canadian military doctrine, it's also very strange. This is the apex of Cold War thinking. The F-35, described as a multi-role fighter, is viewed by the US military as having a role outside homeland defence. Despite the yammering of the likes of "military genius" Dimitri Soudas and his cheerleading "military analysts" who suggest that it is a premier patrol and intercept platform, the F-35 is an attempt to jam too many roles into one airframe. And despite the sales pitch that this aircraft will be capable of all things to all users, the US military doesn't view it that way at all.

The United States military has been and remains very clear that the role of the F-35 is that of an air-to-ground delivery platform. The F-22A Raptor is the US Air Force air superiority fighter and is intentionally assigned to homeland defence. The F-35, on the other hand, is destined for a reach out and touch someone role. In short, it is being designed and built to perform an expeditionary role, exporting a thoroughly devastating weapons package across hostile borders or into hostile regions of a battlespace.

I could suggest that you just take my word for it, but why not get it straight from the horse's mouth. A presentation to the US House Armed Services Committee by the US Air Force.

Page 7:

The F-22A and F-35 each possess unique, complementary, and essential capabilities that together provide the synergistic effects required to maintain that margin of superiority across the spectrum of conflict.

Hmmm. Unique. Complementary. That's nice talk for... they're different.
Page 8:

The F-22A Raptor is the Air Force’s primary air superiority fighter, providing unmatched capabilities for air supremacy, homeland defense and cruise missile defense for the Joint team.

Uh huh.
Page 10:

The F-35 was designed from the bottom-up to be our premier surface-to-air missile killer and is uniquely equipped for this mission with cutting edge processing power, synthetic aperture radar integration techniques, and advanced target recognition.

Surface-to-air missile killer. So, all of you out there telling me how this is just a cat's ass northern patrol platform and that's why we're buying them can get busy explaining why the US Air Force doesn't see it that way.
One only has to look at the other users to understand what the F-35 is all about. The US Navy needs it as a strike aircraft. That's what the US Navy does - it projects force. The Royal Navy (although I seriously doubt an F-35 will ever find itself on the deck of any HM ship) - ditto. The US Marine Corps is an expeditionary force. The F-35 will serve their purposes as a battlespace neutralizer. Air dominance will come from somewhere else.

I'm not saying we don't need a force projection aircraft. Neither am I saying we do. What I'm saying is that the oft repeated garbage that this aircraft is exactly what we need to defend Canadian sovereignty and North American airspace doesn't stand up to it's stated uses by the primary users.

In short, it's time the "military geniuses" like Soudas and his sycophant "military analysts" were called on their endless stream of bullshit.

The real reason the Harperites have decided on this plane is right here. Defence requirements have nothing to do with it.

Pearson and the air force officer

You meet the most interesting people in airports. London MP Glen Pearson found that out and relates a conversation he had with an air force officer.

“Look, of course we want what’s supposedly the best out there; we wouldn’t be a good military if we didn’t.  But I’m not convinced that with the high price, the problems with maintenance, and the cost overruns in production qualifies it as the best for the Canadian forces.”

That is an absolutely true statement by any gauge. No military goes asking for second rate gear.

“For our purposes, I at least wish we had put out some bids for the F-18F Super Hornet,” he observed.  “That’s a pretty good piece of equipment.”  For the next 20 minutes a dedicated career military officer gave this MP a comprehensive education on aircraft and Canada’s future in military operations.

But what Pearson might have found surprising is something which has been swirling through the bazaars for some considerable time now. It just hasn't broken surface in the media.

Barring some cataclysmic event, he reasons that the Canadian forces will be looking for more “soft” missions, the kind that provide protection for peacekeeping operations or more limited forms of combat engagement than Afghanistan.  According to him, the Super Hornet is a better fit for the new role the Canadian forces are about to embrace.

Looking? Probably not too hard. Prepared to accept is more the emphasis. The problem, however goes to another issue: The Harper government has nothing close to a coherent defence policy.
Read more here. 

H/T Dale

Beware the politicians that defence industry leaders lie with

This wasn't just predictable, it was led, as Impolitical points out, by the message management merchants in Harper's office.

The Canadian aerospace industry has entered the political fray to accuse the Liberal Party of putting high-quality jobs at risk by refusing to endorse the government’s plans to purchase new stealth fighter jets.

The "industry" might want to think twice before suffering the machinations of the Harper PR machine. That's a wobbling star and hooking your wagon to it can be perilous.

Lest you forget that conservatives talk a great "defence" story and deliver very little.

F-35. The project, the plane, the mission - from the seat

During the past few days Boris (leading the way) and I have put out a few posts regarding the announced plan to purchase the F-35 Lightning II as a replacement for the Canadian Air Force fleet of F/A-18 fighter jets. Those posts generated some long and highly informative debates in the comments sections. One commenter was clearly very well informed on the subject, from various angles, and expressed some frustration at articles which appeared in national media publications, specifically The National Post, by Mark Collins, and The Toronto Star, by Michael Byers.

Unfortunately, if you don't read the comments section (75 comments can be daunting) you might have missed an important part of the whole debate especially the part offered by an informed, educated Air Force officer in procurement. While not a member of the fighter jet community we invited that commenter to respond to Mr. Collins and Dr. Byers (and to some degree, Mercedes Stephenson) on this site.

His/her post is presented unedited and without further comment except to say that he/she is closer to the subject than any of we regular contributors.

--------------------------

Michael Byers writing in the Sunday edition of the Toronto Star and Mark Collins writing in the National Post's Full Comment have recently sought to portray the decision by the Conservative government to acquire the F-35 Litening II (the Joint Strike Fighter) as wrongheaded and inappropriate for Canada's defence needs.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Setting aside the politics of the purchase and process in which Canada acquiesced to it, there are a number of points both authors have raised about the aircraft's technical merits and the alternatives to the F-35 that I would like to address:

- "stealth" aircraft are offensive platforms equipped solely for "shock and awe" first night types of missions
- that the F-35 lacks the range for the defence of Canada' Arctic
- that the Boeing Super Hornet is viable and cheaper alternative for Canada

These assertions demonstrate a serious lack of understanding of the rationale and reasoning behind the Air Staff's choice of the F-35. To start with, the purchase has not come out of thin air. The Next Generation Fighter Capability (NGFC) office has been in existence for the better part of a decade and has been tasked with (like all other defence procurement programs) finding a platform that will serve the CF for 30+ years after the retirement of the CF-18 Hornet.

To accomplish this task, one must understand the evolving nature of the air threat in the decades to come. This environment has markedly changed in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War the best platforms our fighter pilots might encounter were usually possessed by the Soviet Union and to a somewhat lesser extent, the Warsaw Pact forces. And while fighter aircraft were sold to friendly regimes elsewhere in the world, they were rarely top of the line.

In the post-Cold War era though, this situation has been reversed. Russia, starved for cash, particularly for its aerospace and defence programs now seems to have no qualms selling its best technology to anybody willing to pay. The proposed sale of the S-300 air defence system to Iran is an excellent example. But it's even worse on the combat aviation side of the business. Some of the best versions of its platforms are not even flown by the Russians. For example, While the Russians field several hundred Su-27s, they have sold the Su-30 MKI, a significantly more advanced model of the Su-30 (a derivative of the Su-27) to India and the Indians intend to field hundreds of them in the years to come. The Chinese also operate over 150 of less capable Su-30 MKK (still more advanced than the base Su-30 operated by Russia). And while Canada entertains no desires to enter into conflict with the rising Asian powers, more disconcerting for us, is that this platform (the Su-30 in various variants) is rapidly becoming the air superiority fighter of choice around the Pacific Ring and for those flush with cash. New operators of the Su-30 now include Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Uganda, Algeria and (most importantly for North Americans) Venezuela. The Russians even go so far as to develop advanced platforms largely for the export markets, that they don't intend to induct into service themselves. The MiG-35 is a good example of this.

The Russians aren't the only ones in the game, either. The Chinese have also recently awakened to the revenue potential of exports of advanced fighter jets. Their recent partnership with Pakistan for the J-10 program is the first effort at exporting a medium capability fourth generation fighter. This is an aircraft that's on par with the F-16 or Mirage 2000 and is being offered up by the Chinese, often as a sweetener (and a way to recover some of their spending) to their resource partners in Africa.

Looking at this proliferation of advanced 4th and 4.5 gen aircraft around the world, combined with the sales of advanced anti-air systems like the S-300, the CF is rightly concerned that potential adversaries today are fielding platforms that may already outclass the CF-18. For example, the Sudanese are now fielding significantly modernized MiG-29s. Should Canada decide to participate in any sort of action similar to Operation Allied Force (NATO's intervention in Kosovo), it would mean our fighter pilots would be facing opposing platforms that are potentially as capable as their own. And while training, weapons and tactics can give us the edge, the margin is far too discomforting for the Air Staff on which to risk the lives of our fighter crews.

The situation in the future does not look markedly better. As platforms like the J-10, Su-30, MiG-35 and even the Su-35 proliferate around the world, the CF will face a significant challenge in maintaining its combat edge in any potential combat scenario overseas. Domestically, the development and fielding of 5th generation fighters by the Russians and Chinese (combined with China's attempt to field aircraft carriers) will pose significant challenges to our security in the Arctic. For this reason, the combat aircraft that the CF acquires for the future has to possess certain characteristics that ensure our crews have the ability to counter the threats they will face abroad and in the defence of Canada. For a small, single type multirole fleet there are three characteristics: stealth, advanced sensors/networking/sensor fusion and improved aerodynamics.

It is unfortunate that some of these characteristics (such as stealth) have been mis-characterized in the press as being solely required for offensive missions. Stealth characteristics dramatic improve survivability. While stealth technology has been associated with offensive aircraft to date (particularly by the public watching "shock and awe" footage), in the future air combat environment of highly capable 4th and 4.5 generation fighters combined with advanced anti-air systems like the S-300, stealth is essential for the survivability of the platform. The enemy can't engage our fighters if they can't detect them. Stealth gives our pilots a significantly better shot at completing their missions and coming home safely.

Advanced sensors, networking and sensor fusion is also vital for a future fighter platform. These systems dramatically increase the pilots awareness of his surroundings and allow several fighters to operate as a single system as opposed to a team of aircraft. This significantly improves both their combat power and combat efficiency. Such networking and fusion not only improves situational awareness, it allows the pilots to engage targets they cannot "see" using the combined air picture derived from multiple sensors on multiple aircraft.

The third characteristics is improvements in the aerodynamics characteristics of the aircraft. The big improvement here is the internal carriage of ordinance. Weapons and fuel tanks hanging from the fuel tanks incur significant aerodynamic drag penalties. This causes aircraft to significantly underperform from their advertised figures on range and speed. Internal carriage of weapons eliminate these drag penalties allowing the aircraft to perform much closer to the glossy brochure figures. An alternative here would be an improved airframe and engine that allows for supercruise (the ability to travel faster than Mach 1 without using fuel guzzling after-burners).

Aerodynamics brings us to the next major discussion point: range. The Joint Strike Fighter has been impugned as possessing insufficient range to adequately operate in Canada's vast Arctic expanses. Is there any truth to that? To answer this question, range has to be understood the way engineers and pilots discuss it. For us, there are two range numbers that matter: ferry range and combat radius. The first lets you pre-position your aircraft. The second lets you fight as far away from your base, tanker or whatever you are trying to protect. In the Canadian context, the F-35 has more than adequate ferry range to reposition from Cold Lake to our forward operating bases in the Arctic. But combat radius is where the F-35 shines. It's combat radius is significantly higher than most of its competitors (except for maybe the Eurofighter Typhoon) and the currently in-service CF-18. This means the F-35 will be able to operate further away from its base or tanker, putting distance between the enemy and their targets. In a future where our potential polar adversaries are fielding advanced fighters with significantly longer range missiles, putting some distance between their combat aircraft and our defenceless tankers or bases or urban centres is vitally important. Lastly on range, Michael Byers suggests that the range is insufficient because it takes 8 hours for a tanker to arrive in the Arctic. Here he is getting range and endurance mixed up. They are not the same thing. Simply put, however, the F-35 has the requisite range and endurance to operate in the Canadian domestic environment.

And all this leads us to our third major point of contention: alternatives to the F-35. Several have been proposed, and if the Air Force was willing to compromise on its requirements, some (the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale for example) could be contenders. However, the one being pushed by some commentators opposed to the JSF purchase, is the Boeing F-18 E/F Super Hornet (largely because of its price). This is an aircraft that is wholly inadequate for Canada's future defence needs. Mark Collins insists that its adequate since the US Navy operates the aircraft. However, that's only half the story. The US Navy does indeed operate the Super Hornet in the fleet air defence role today. It replaced the F-14 Tomcat in that role. However, it does not intend to do this in the years to come. Like the CF, the US Navy too has recognized the changing air threat environment and it too has committed to the Joint Strike Fighter program. As has the other operator of the Super Hornet: the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Both these operators recognize that going forward the Super Hornet will not possess sufficient survivability in a medium or high threat battlespace. So both are procuring Joint Strike Fighters to escort the Super Hornet. That should have told Mark Collins something. The Super Hornet is being relegated to the role a light bomber in the future, a bomb truck. This is not what the CF desires in its next fighter. And this is not what Canada needs for its own defences.

The Super Hornet has a significantly lower combat radius than the F-35 (meaning it has to fight closer to what it's trying to protect), no stealth characteristics (a must for survivability in the future) and no improvements in its aerodynamic characteristics over our existing CF-18. In sum, it's a terrible alternative for the Canadian Forces. Those pushing the Super Hornet, are either unaware of the CF's requirements or don't care about them and seek to simply impose the cheapest solution possible.

And the Super Hornet isn't all that cheap either. The RAAF's experience is instructive for Canada. The Aussies spent about AUS$ 6 billion, paying out about US$ 2.2 billion to acquire 24 aircraft and agreeing to a US$ 2.4 billion agreement for 10 years of support. Given the Australian experience, a fleet of far less capable Super Hornet would cost us between $6-$7 billion to acquire and up to $13 billion to support over 20 years. Contrast that to the $9 billion spent on acquiring 65 F-35s and a rumoured cost of $7 billion for a 20 year maintence contract. So while the Super Hornet might have a lower acquisition cost, it is far more expensive to maintain (understandable since engines account for one third of an aircraft's maintenance costs and the Super Hornet has two) over the long run, significantly negating any savings in acquisition costs. Furthermore, being less current that the F-35 also then means that the CF would have to spend billions on upgrades sooner to keep the aircraft at par with the threats it might face. This makes the Super Hornet a terrible value proposition. We'd be paying significantly more over the long run for a lot less capability.

In summary, the Air Staff and the CF are right when they suggest that the Joint Strike Fighter is the most capable and most cost-effective solution that Canada can field in the decades to come. It meets or exceeds all our defence requirements at a reasonable long term price. The alternatives are all significantly more expensive and could result in capability gaps in the later stages of the platforms expected service life (2030-2045), possibly requiring significant and expensive upgrades or simply sacrificing survivability putting our air crews and possibly our national security at risk.

While it's understandable that some commentators and politicians are unhappy with the method in which the Joint Strike Fighter was selected, they should understand that significant efforts were put into studying the future threat environment, evaluating the options and identifiying the best value proposition for Canadian taxpayer, and the best platform for the Canadian Forces for the next 30 years. The Air Staff's recommendations should not be taken lightly. Their decision was not concluded in a flippant manner. And those attempting to portray the F-35 as a unaffordable luxury, a "cadillac" of fighters are doing significant disservice to the fighter pilots, engineers and civil servants who have spent the better part of a decade studying the issue. It's one thing to criticze the government for its processes. It's another matter entirely, to challenge the choice of the CF, assume you know better than the professionals and then insist on a cheaper alternative without knowing if it's suitable or not. I sincerely hope these commentators will be a little more responsible in the months and years to come and place the needs of the CF and concerns for our national security over partisan bickering.

--------------------------------

F-35 Lightning II goodies to chew on

Search and search and search and still I could find nothing public about which of the three variants of F-35 Canada is intending to purchase. A friend called and told me but, like me, he had no particular source. Neither the defence minister nor the "military analysts" appearing at press conferences and on TV and radio provided anything beyond the words F-35, after which they had to wipe the drool from their chins.

Infuriating, or what? The government, the pundits, falling all over themselves to tell us how cool this is and they won't tell us which one.

So... check out another source. Aha! We're buying the cheap one! That makes me feel better. That I had to dig it out of the company that's building them and it wasn't offered at the announcement makes me wonder how much people like MacKay care for you to know.

The version the Canadian Air Force is buying is the least expensive of the three variants and in today's dollars it will be around $60 million per aircraft, said Lockheed spokeswoman Kim Testa.

That would be the "A" variant.

And then there is the issue, as the article above points out, that this is a sole-source contract. Commenters have suggested there was no other way. Maybe... maybe not, but the Defence Minister certainly promised that there would be an open and transparent competition, and he emphatically stated that there was more than one contender:

The joint strike fighter is one of the two aircraft, and there may be others. But I think those are the two main contenders that we are looking at.

Uh oh. Then he said this:

I just want to be very clear on the record that the reference to the next generation of fighter aircraft does not preclude a competition, and an open and transparent one.

So... anyone notice smoke coming out of MacKay's ass? Did we miss that little bit of Harper government transparency?

It isn't as if this whole project has been a bed of roses either. It's had its own share of plagues, not the least of which was the US Secretary of Defense firing the program manager back in February. Oh... oops.

So far, that performance has “not been what it should” Gates said. Total costs have ballooned by more than 45% since the program’s inception. According to some reports, the stealth jet isn’t even that stealthy. Its engines run the risk of burning holes in the decks of the ships its supposed to lift off from. Final tests for the plane could be pushed back until as late as 2016, a two-year delay.

And I will remind readers that it is now July - that happened almost five months ago.
Looks like Gates got on the case and fixed things... maybe. There is a niggling rumour that Major General Heinz lost his job because he wanted an alternative engine brought into the program - to reduce overall costs. Gates didn't agree and it is suggested his hesitation had more to do with politics than cost.

Although a congressional aide said he was not “surprised” by Gates’ decision, the aide also made clear that he thought Heinz was a fall guy. “He is not the first to provide his best professional judgment and be fired for it because it is contrary to White House and Second Gates’ politics,” the aide said in an email. The aide wrote back speculating that Gen. Heinz may well have ticked off Gates with his quiet but persistent support for a second engine for the F-135. Heinz told me and others several times that a second engine could well result in lower costs and provide operational benefits by lessening the program’s dependence on a single engine. “Gates does not like this kind of thinking, no matter how much sense it makes. Heinz wasn’t in lock step with the politics — he is interested in future fighter force readiness and affordability,” the aide said.

Interesting. (Don't get carried away. This is an alternative to the Pratt & Whitney F-135; not a 2nd strap on.)

What is being discussed is the GE/Rolls Royce F-136 which could be made considerably more efficient with an upgrade in the future. And there's a good reason to have a fleet with two different brands of power plant.

The F-35 programme chief, Brig Gen David Heinz, has said he supports the DOD's decision, but he also believes that dueling JSF engine programmes could yield cost savings and reduce operational risk of a fleet-wide grounding caused by an engine problem.

You can get fired for that kind of thinking.

It remains to be seen if Airshow MacKay can follow the logic.