Friday, August 11, 2006

Pondering Lebanon - part 5

Given the problems Israel is having in Lebanon, two options for Israel appear to be evolving out of the current war. The first option is the ceasefire deal that is currently being thrashed out largely between the US and France in the UNSC. The second is the expansion by necessity as a result of the failure of the first (from the Israeli POV) of the ground war.

Ceasefire
The war has displaced as many as 900 000 Lebanese out of a total population of just under 3.9 million. That is effectively one quarter of the country. It has bombed and destroyed border crossings, ports, bridges, roads, power stations, etc. It considers all vehicle traffic in south Lebanon hostile. What all this does aside from destroying innocent lives, is render the Lebanese government impotent in controlling anything that goes on within its borders. It cannot provide aid to its population, and cannot stop the bombing. It also cannot stop Hizbollah from resisting or launching rockets at Israel. Events are well beyond Lebanese government control and it can do nothing but feebly react to Israeli bombing in the areas where emergency vehicles can still drive without becoming targets.
A state with ineffective government, a quarter of its population internally displaced, under attack, unable to have a say in its own ceasefire negotiations, with a powerful non-state military force within, and with much of its infrastructure destroyed, is a non-viable state.
The ceasefire currently being negotiated at the UNSC, largely between the US and France, is meant to introduce an international military force (so far France and Indonesia seem to be on the table) under either existing or new mandate to buffer between Hizbollah and Israel. This is only part of the picture. The other part of it that isn’t mentioned, is that the non-viability of Lebanon will also require foreign NGO and bilateral aid to redevelop the country; the conditions of which the Lebanese will have little control over. Post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina is the picture to reference here. A Lebanon crawling with white NGO Landcruisers and blue-capped international soldiers is not one that presents much of a threat to Israel. The worse Lebanon breaks, the longer the international community must remain in the country to fix it.

Thus through war, Israel creates a situation whereby the humanitarian nature of the international community will be used to solve its security problem. Of course, the success of this scenario depends on whether or not Hizbollah and Israel accept the option presented. Neither will sanction any agreement that does not meet their interests, especially one that allows the rockets to keep dropping on Israel or leads to the dismantling of Hizbollah.

The Lebanese government are not being given a voice here because this is not being done in their interests. It is being done for Israel and the US. The architects will simply present the Lebanese with whatever option ends up most feasible and with their country in ruins the Lebanese will have little option but to take whatever they get. Or at least that’s the theory.

War
This one is much less nuanced. If the first option fails to get off the ground, the Israelis will be forced to carry on their campaign at least until the rockets stop. The recent change in command Dave described, and Israeli government approval of a broader offensive indicates that the Israelis have accepted that this will be a costly venture and are willing to do what they think they need to destroy Hizbollah. Israel has a large army and a massive armoury. Southern Lebanon is a small geographic area so theoretically Hizbollah can be severely weakened given enough time, but at cost. Once this happens, the scenario I described in option one comes into play again.

Other Considerations
I’ve avoided discussing possible conspiracies being voiced now linking the current war to things such as an Israeli desire for Litani water resources, or a co-US/Israeli proxy war against Iran. Not because these aren’t worth pondering, but because I think the main interest of Israel in the immediate is stopping Hizbollah rockets and eliminating the military threat on its borders. Other interests may well be playing their part, but these will only be confirmed or dismissed over time. There are so many global and local ‘interests’ at work in the ME, that things are beyond control. More variables are being added to an already complex equation. It’s Syriana times 1000 and no outcome is guaranteed. Oil, God, Fear and Grand Strategy.

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